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I. INTRODUCTION
Like the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures, the privilege against self-incrimination stands as a barrier
to the government's acquisition of information about criminal ac-
tivities. The moral analogue in private relations to the Fourth
Amendment right is quite straightforward. One person should not
rummage about the private spaces of another seeking signs of bad
behavior unless he has very powerful reasons. The Fourth Amend-
ment similarly limits the government, generally permitting
searches only upon probable cause. The private moral analogue to
the Fifth Amendment's right of silence is harder to identify, its
analysis is more complex and the judgments of right and wrong are
more dubious. When may one person properly ask another if he
has done something wrong; what are the responsibilities of the per-
son asked when such questions are put; and what may the ques-
tioner assume if no helpful response is forthcoming? Uncertainty
about these matters may help explain the profound disagreements
[Vol. 23:15
RIGHT TO SILENCE
over the right to silence, considered by some a pernicious impedi-
ment to the discovery of truth and by others "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."'1
My discussion is based on the belief that exploration of the ordi-
nary morality that governs questioning of those who may have
done something wrong will aid us to understand what relations are
appropriate between an inquiring state and suspected individuals
in the criminal process, and may also influence our views about
how broadly the existing constitutional right should be construed.
I am not among those who believe that clarification of fundamen-
tals often produces blinding changes of view, so I expect some
strong disagreement with my evaluation of private situations, the
manner in which I link these to. relations between the state and
individuals, and my views about constitutional interpretation. I
hope, however, that the process of working through the issues I
raise will illuminate the reader's own perspectives on the right to
silence and on the broader concerns about a citizen's relation to his
government which that right raises.
My own analysis eventuates in the conclusion that the basic core
of the right to silence is morally justified and deserves constitu-
tional protection. I suggest that the Supreme Court, however, has
interpreted the right too expansively in its general refusal to per-
mit inferences from failures to speak and in its constraints on dis-
missal of government employees who refuse to answer questions
about their performance of duty.2 I also suggest that the Court has
not yet gone far enough in protecting suspects from the pressures
and manipulative strategies of informal interrogation.
II. STANDARDS OF MORAL EVALUATION
Any attempt to say what actions and social practices are mor-
ally justifiable raises ancient and thorny questions about the status
of such judgments. Though I cannot here defend my own under-
standings and aspirations, or even explicate these in ample depth,
I do wish to say a few words about how I conceive the specific eval-
1. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
2. The qualifying word "general" is important here, since I do think the Court's approach
sound for situations in which a person has been questioned before substantial evidence of
guilt exists.
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uations that constitute the heart of my presentation.
When people say, without qualification, that an act is morally
wrong, they purport to do more than express their own attitudes
about the act or the prevailing attitude of their culture; they assert
that in some sense the act is objectively wrong. Whether any such
assertions are warranted is more doubtful. I believe that they are,
and that ethical judgments have a grounding that transcends
human opinion. Readers unable to accept this view may at least
admit the possibility of judgments that are based on fundamental
values of a culture,4 judgments that may subject crude social atti-
tudes about behavior and institutions to demands of rationality,
universality, and coherence with other views.5 Such judgments,
rooted in a particular culture, might be thought to have special
relevance for judges, and perhaps for legislators, even if more tran-
scendent judgments can also be made.'
On this subject, in any event, I cannot confidently identify dif-
ferences between my attempt to make judgments of the sort I
think possible and those based on fundamental cultural values.
The crucial values for my inquiry are that people should accord
respect for the dignity and autonomy of each other, that they
should show concern for their fellows' needs, and that they should
act to promote human welfare; these values all receive significant
recognition in American culture. Another reason why separation of
attempted "objective" judgment from cultural judgment is so hard
in respect to the matters with which I deal is that they do not lend
themselves comfortably to absolute cross-cultural conclusions.
Whether or not torturing and killing innocent people is wrong in
all times and all places, the appropriateness of particular kinds of
lies or refusals to respond depends considerably on the expecta-
3. J.L. Mackie has a succinct and convincing discussion of this point. See J. MAcmr,
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 30-35 (1977).
4. I pass over the serious problems of determining which values are fundamental and of
dealing with confusion or substantial division of opinion on important issues.
5. On one view, these demands are imposed by the nature of moral language. On another,
they are requirements of rational or moral action which people can somehow apprehend as
appropriate to adopt.
6. The issue is complex, and the statement in text requires support of a theory explaining
why such actors have a moral obligation to perform their roles and why those roles should
be conceived as including reference to community values.
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tions of members of a given society.' My proposals for personal
moral standards and for legal principles are designedly meant to be
sensitive to the general social environment in which we find
ourselves.
Most substantive moral arguments about proper behavior are
cast either in terms of likely consequences deemed desirable or
harmful, or in terms of standards that classify actions as intrinsi-
cally right or wrong. Many "deontological," or standard-based, ar-
guments have consequentialist underpinnings, and some "conse-
queritialist" arguments have implicit deontological components, so
distinguishing the two sorts of arguments is no simple task.
Whether or not all valid nonconsequentialist standards can some-
how be justified by the desirable consequences flowing from their
adoption, a simple and open-ended consequential calculus is not an
appropriate basis for persons to make individual moral choices or
to evaluate institutional arrangements. They should be guided by
both deontological principles and by consequentialist assessments.
Without trying to explicate how the two kinds of considerations
would relate to each other in a comprehensive moral theory,8 I
shall simply assume the relevance of both in the discussion that
follows.
My primary focus is upon the respect and concern that individu-
als owe to each other and that governments owe to their citizens.
By paying less attention to the efficient pursuit of truth, I do not
mean to disregard the importance of that goal for evaluation of
rights in the criminal process. But whatever one's views about how
truth can best be found, arguments about the kind of right to si-
lence that comports with respect for individuals also deserve atten-
tion; and these are arguments whose strength citizens and courts
can evaluate without relying upon controversial empirical assump-
tions.9 Moreover, my belief is that the crucial disagreements con-
7. For example, when one decides whether to lie to a host about one's enjoyment of a
party or to lie to a student about the quality of a paper, it makes a difference whether
truthful (negative) statements are considered socially acceptable or personally offensive.
8. One recent interesting attempt along these lines is Charles Fried's RIGHT AND WRONG
(1978). For criticisms that Fried's approach is too heavily deontological, see Bairy, Review,
88 YALE L.J. 629 (1979); Munzer, Persons and Consequences: Observations on Fried's Right
and Wrong, 77 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1979).
9. It may be that many arguments about moral rights do rest partly on very deep and
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cerning the practices I discuss are over the moral rights of individ-
uals, not over the effective discovery of truth.
III. SILENCE AND FALSEHOOD IN PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS
How one person should act toward another whom he suspects of
wronging him depends on the precise character of the particular
relationship and the wrong, so I cannot hope that an abstract and
general account will produce definitive standards for all situations.
But such an account can highlight some very important factors. I
start with two basic distinctions: one between close relationships of
trust and other private relationships, the other between occasions
when a substantial basis exists to suspect a person of wrongoing
and those when no such basis is present. By close relationships of
trust I refer mainly to relations between family members and
friends, but some working relations can take on this character after
a period of time: one thinks of colleagues in a continuing enter-
prise, such as members of the same faculty.
A. Slender Suspicion in a Close Relationship
Suppose that A in a close relationship of trust recognizes a slight
possibility that B has wronged him, has breached a confidence,
taken personal property, or violated some special undertaking,
such as the commitment to sexual fidelity in many marriages. Im-
agine, for example, that Ann cannot find her unusual bracelet and
is aware that one of the many things that conceivably could have
happened is that her roommate, Betty, may have stolen it. At this
point, Ann may properly ask Betty whether she has seen the brace-
let, but she may not appropriately ask her questions that are
plainly directed to the chance that she may have taken it. In close
adult relationships, trust is a characteristic and central element.
We count on friends and loved ones having confidence in us, some-
times more confidence than we may deserve; if these people show
they lack confidence in us, our self-esteem suffers and the bonds of
complex empirical assumptions (e.g., about what kinds of human relations will be exper-
ienced as most fulfilling). But, perhaps because these assumptions are often not exposed and
perhaps because they are so obviously beyond proof or disproof at this stage of human de-




the relationships are strained. If Ann treats seriously the slender
chance that Betty has stolen the bracelet, she shows a lack of trust
and grants Betty less respect than is called for by the relationship.
What may Betty properly do if Ann inquires about her possible
guilt? She may answer the questions honestly, the course many
people would choose, even if she resents their implication. But if
Ann asks her to account for her activities, she might say something
like "That's none of your business," or "I won't dignify that with
an answer." Ann's improper question does not create a duty upon
Betty to answer. Though Betty may decide that a response is mor-
ally preferable to silence in order to reassure Ann in her insecuri-
ties and minimize the strain on the relationship,10 she does not owe
Ann a response, and Ann has no legitimate complaint if she fails to
provide one.
With greater hesitation, I reach the same conclusion if Betty ac-
tually happens to be guilty. Betty undoubtedly has a duty to repair
her original wrong to Ann, insofar as she can; but unless disclosure
is vital to repairing the damage,11 Betty does not have a duty to
tell Ann that she has wronged her.1 2 Ann's improper question,
though fortuitously on target, does not create a new duty on Betty
to disclose her wrong.What conclusion can Ann properly reach if Betty refuses to re-
spond? Plainly, she lacks sufficient ground to suppose that Betty is
guilty, because Betty's silence may well have been the outraged re-
action of an innocent, untrusted, friend. The more troubling ques-
tion is whether she can give that silence some weight if further
evidence of Betty's guilt appears. She might reason as follows:
I was wrong to question Betty and she was justified in not re-
sponding. Still, more guilty than innocent people would refuse
to respond, so Betty's silence makes me think it is more likely
10. In some situations, both the questioner and the relationship may benefit more from a
refusal to respond, which can serve as a powerful reminder of the unacceptability of the
original imposition.
11. For example, if Betty still has access to the bracelet, she could retrieve it and put it
somewhere so that Ann would find it and think it had been misplaced.
12. This judgment is debatable. Some extremely close relationships may be based on as-
sumptions of such complete openness that acknowledgement of any wrong would be a duty.
In addition, over a broader range of relationships, there may be a duty to reveal certain
kinds of wrongs, if not others.
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that she stole the bracelet. My responsibilities to Betty do not
require me to disregard this relevant information, though my
own improper question produced it.
If Ann were capable of dispassionate evaluation, I believe this re-
sponse would be defensible. In most real situations, however, a per-
son whose excessive suspicions lead her to put improper questions,
may not be able to judge rationally the weight of a refusal to re-
spond. Once Ann recognizes her own wrong and the propriety of a
silent reaction, perhaps she should try to disregard that reaction as
possible evidence of guilt.
B. Solidly Grounded Suspicion in a Close Relationship
I now want to introduce an important change in the facts. Cathy,
a mutual friend who is unaware that Ann's bracelet is missing, has
written Ann that she was surprised to find Betty's sister wearing a
bracelet identical to Ann's. Ann knows that Betty took a trip to
visit her family about the time the bracelet disappeared. Although
other possibilities cannot be excluded,13 Ann now believes, as
would a neutral observer, that Betty probably took the bracelet
and gave it to her sister.14
The close relationship of trust no longer bars an attempt by Ann
to find out if Betty has taken the bracelet. She cannot be expected
simply to discount the chance of Betty's guilt or to carry on the
relationship without attempting to resolve the matter.15 The most
natural, open, course for Ann is to tell Betty what Cathy's letter
says and ask for an explanation." However tactfully Ann phrases
13. For example, Ann may have admired Betty's bracelet and bought a similar one for her
sister, someone else with access to the apartment may have given the bracelet to Betty's
sister, or Cathy may have been mistaken.
14. In any genuine situation, A may know B so well that he will rationally continue to
believe that B has not committed a certain kind of wrong despite strong extrinsic evidence
to the contrary. And, because of the bond of friendship, A may continue to believe in B's
innocence even after an observer with A's knowledge of B's character would cease to do so.
If A's confidence is rationally based, it will vary with the kind of wrong involved. For exam-
ple, a person who would never steal from a friend may be sloppy about keeping secrets.
15. Solidly grounded suspicion, if not resolved, will work like a festering sore in Ann's
feelings toward Betty unless Ann is indifferent to Betty's probable wrong or is especially
saintly.




the question,17 Betty will perceive that Ann's confidence in her in-
tegrity is less than complete, but if Betty is fair-minded, she will
recognize that Ann's shaken confidence is warranted by the exter-
nal facts.1 '
How else might Ann seek to learn if Betty has stolen the brace-
let? She could make a thorough search of Betty's belongings to see
if anything else she has lost turns up.19 She could ask a friend (or a
professional detective) to get close to Betty and try to trick her
into admissions. She could ask other members of Betty's family
how the sister got her bracelet. Ann could simply keep a very close
eye on Betty, or lay potential traps for her, leaving jewelry to
which only Betty would have access.
Most of these alternatives would avoid directly exposing Ann's
suspicions, and thus might spare Betty's feelings, but each has se-
rious drawbacks from a moral point of view. The search involves
an invasion of Betty's personal space. Getting someone to elicit ad-
missions by deception may be even worse, resting as it does on an
extreme manipulation of Betty's social environment. Even the
more innocuous techniques of watching Betty carefully and "lay-
ing traps" require deceit by Ann, who must simulate full trust in
Betty while acting directly contrary to such trust. Writing first to
Betty's family may avoid this objection, but it is a kind of embar-
rassing insult to a friend.
One perspective for comparing these alternatives is to imagine
Betty's feelings about them. If Betty is innocent, -she may well be
initially hurt by direct questions, but she can come to accept their
appropriateness. If she subsequently learns that she has been sub-
ject to a search or the attentions of a pretended friend, she will be
outraged. We can imagine her anguished cry upon hearing that
Ann has written her family, "Why didn't you come to me first?"
17. She might say something like, "I'm sure there is some innocent explanation for this,
but Cathy writes me that ......
18. Ann would show more respect for Betty if she took the position, "I don't care what
the facts seem to be; I cannot believe Betty would harm me"; but such blind trust in the
face of contrary evidence goes beyond what Betty can reasonably expect. Of course, if Betty
realizes that Ann is aware that Betty's character renders this kind of theft almdst unthink-
able, see note 14 supra, then Betty may reasonably expect Ann to discount fairly substantial
extrinsic evidence.
19. I pass over possible use of electronic surveillance, which seems too fanciful here.
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Discovering that Ann has been "watching" her or laying traps will
also make Betty feel wronged. If Betty is guilty, she may feel she
has less complaint if other tactics are employed against her, but
she still will probably be offended that Ann has tried to determine
her guilt without first giving her a chance to explain.
Yet another alternative is open for Ann. She could simply as-
sume Betty's guilt on the basis of Cathy's letter and end the rela-
tionship without revealing the true reason. That course shows little
respect or concern for Betty, who might be innocent, and who,
even if guilty, might have been able to respond to Ann in a way
that would have preserved for both of them the value of their
friendship.
This analysis suggests the following generalization: in close rela-
tionships, when A has strong grounds to suspect B of wrongdoing,
A's laying the grounds of his suspicion before B and asking for an
explanation is not only morally appropriate action, it is more re-
spectful of B's dignity and autonomy than most alternative ap-
proaches to discovering the truth.
When Ann asks her for an explanation, Betty now has powerful
moral reasons for responding. Ann undeniably has a legitimate in-
terest in finding out what has happened to her bracelet, and exter-
nal evidence strongly suggests that Betty's honest response to her
appropriate inquiries will contribute to that end. Moreover, Ann's
justified suspicions threaten their relationship. Betty has a duty as
a friend both to aid Ann's search for the facts and to do what she
honestly can to prevent a bitter termination of the relationship. If
Betty is innocent, no countervailing moral reason could now sup-
port her refusal to answer Ann's questions truthfully.20 What if
Betty is guilty? She may believe that Ann will actually be so
harmed by learning the truth that she should not reveal it. Such
justifications have a certain plausibility when the original wrong is
sexual cheating or conversational breach of confidence, but they
are doubly suspect. When an act will strongly serve one's own in-
terests, evaluating fairly whether the act will genuinely protect
someone else as well is difficult. And deciding that lies will protect
someone actively seeking the truth constitutes a paternalist refusal
20. Unless she has an independent right to withhold some extraordinary facts that are an
integral part of her account.
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to let the other person decide what is good for him, a plain impair-
ment of his autonomy.2"
If Betty does decide to protect Ann by concealing the truth, a
refusal to respond hardly will be effective. Only lies will suffice,
and they require a heavier justification than mere failure to re-
spond. A different ground Betty might assert for refusing to tell
the truth is that she has a moral privilege not to bring harmful
consequences upon herself. I shall discuss a possible self-preserva-
tion justification more fully below, and here will say only that
when close friends and family members alone are involved, the
consequences of admissions of wrongdoing will usually be uncer-
tain. For this reason, and because one is under a powerful duty to
respond to questions that have been justifiably put by a close ac-
quaintance, the claim that one can lie or remain silent to protect
himself is not very attractive in this context.22
How may Ann justifiably react if Betty does refuse to respond?
She will rightly perceive Betty's silence now as substantially pro-
bative of guilt; and since her own questioning was appropriate, no
possible bar will exist to her according silence the weight it natu-
rally has in this context. Moreover, Ann has the independent com-
plaint that Betty has failed to fulfill an important duty of friend-
ship. In their personal relations, Ann would be justified in acting as
if Betty had committed the original wrong.2 s
At this stage, the only sense in which Betty has a moral right to
silence against Ann2 4 in regard to the lost bracelet is the very weak
sense in which she has a moral right to silence on every subject.
Ann cannot coerce Betty to respond, and if she tricks or pressures
Betty into speaking, she violates Betty's autonomy and dignity.
But these techniques are morally objectionable regardless of what
21. Matters are sometimes more complex. In some intimate relations,one person may give
signals that he does not want to know the truth about certain matters even if he requests
the truth on particular occasions.
22. A distinction is drawn by Kenneth Winston between relations in the criminal process
and those in families and other continuing cooperative arrangements. Winston, Self-Incrim-
ination in Context: Establishing Procedural Protections in Juvenile and College Discipli-
nary Proceedings, 48 S. CAL. L. Rav. 813, 825 (1975).
23. Whether that will warrant termination of the friendship will depend on the magni-
tude of the wrong and the reasons Betty offers for refusing to respond.
24. This is an important qualification. Betty may have no duty to reveal her wrong to
uninvolved third persons.
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Ann wishes to learn from Betty and the strength of Betty's duty to
provide answers. Betty has no special right to silence concerning
her possible guilt.
C. Slender Suspicion in Less Personal Relationships
Will our conclusions differ if the relationship between A and B is
less personal? I shall use an example of employer-employee rela-
tions, recognizing, of course, its limited power in light of the im-
mense variety of relations into which suspicions can intrude. Ar-
thur owns and runs a grocery store with fifteen employees,
including Bob, who has been working for six months. Initially, Ar-
thur starts to suspect that he is missing some food, but he is not
sure any theft has occurred, much less which, if any, of his employ-
ees might be involved. Arthur may appropriately ask his employees
if they have seen anything suspicious, but he should not question
each to test his possible guilt. Though Arthur has not the same
personal basis for trusting his employees that Ann has for trusting
Betty, he still should assume that each is performing his duties
honestly until a solid basis exists for supposing otherwise. Each of
us needs to be treated as honest and trustworthy in ordinary rela-
tionships; inquiries based on remote conjecture do not accord due
respect to those questioned. Do not misunderstand me. When gen-
uinely momentous matters are at stake, treating everyone as po-
tentially untrustworthy may be necessary. But even when employ-
ees understand the need for periodic lie detector tests or daily
searches, they may feel degraded by them, at least until they are
numbed by familiarity. Such treatment is to be avoided unless the
stakes are very high indeed. So Arthur would be wrong at this
point to question Bob as a potential suspect.
If Arthur does so, Bob would be justified in refusing to answer.
Unless protected by union contracts, few employees would engage
in a job-risking failure to respond, but whatever self-interest may
dictate, Bob has no moral duty to answer Arthur-for the same
reason Betty had no duty to answer at this stage.2 5 This conclusion
holds even if he has stolen the food. He then has duties to stop
25. One might argue, however, that one of Bob's duties as an employee is to account for
his work activities whenever asked to do so by his employer, and that his duty to respond is
therefore stronger than Betty's.
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stealing and to repair the original wrong, but he does not have an
initial duty to come forward and admit his wrong unless that is
required for reparation, and Arthur's unjustified inquiries do not
create a new duty to admit his guilt.
Because so few innocent employees will fail to answer, Bob's re-
fusal may point toward guilt more than a similar refusal by Betty.
But because the refusal is consistent with angered innocence,
plainly it is not an adequate basis for Arthur to conclude that Bob
is guilty. If further evidence of Bob's guilt comes to light, there
may be no moral objection to Arthur according original silence its
actual probative weight. If Arthur, however, recognizes the impro-
priety of his original questions, he may also assume that he cannot
fairly evaluate the likely significance of a silent response and may
properly try to disregard it as any evidence of guilt.
D. Solidly Grounded Suspicion in Less Personal Relationships
If Arthur has special reason to suspect Bob because, for exam-
ple, another employee has reported him, questions directed toward
his possible guilt become appropriate. Indeed, in less personal rela-
tionships the point at which such inquiries are acceptable may
come earlier than with close friends and family members, since A's
assumption that B is trustworthy will be less deeply rooted, and
treatment as a possible suspect will not wound B so much. As with
the close relationships, questioning shows B more respect than
searches or deceitful attempts to obtain admissions. Employers,
however, have recognized supervisory responsibilities over employ-
ees, and special scrutiny of B, or traps, or initial attempts to get
information from others may be more acceptable here than among
friends. Nevertheless, inquiries put to Bob are certainly one proper
way for Arthur to proceed when has has substantial grounds to
think Bob guilty.
One of Bob's responsibilities as an employee is to aid Arthur in
resolving legitimate concerns about the business. 26 Both Bob's im-
26. Edgar Jones has written, "there is a demonstrable industrial and arbitral expectation
that an employee shall respond informatively to those questions of his employer which are
reasonably related to assuring the success of the enterprise." Jones, Evidentiary Concepts
in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L.
Rpv. 1241, 1287 (1966). This passage is quoted and the relevance of the silence in work
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plied commitment to performance when he took the job and the
general benefits of fulfilling such expectations constitute moral
grounds for Bob to act as his employee role requires.2 7 If Bob is
innocent and is now questioned by Arthur, he has a moral duty to
explain his activities, so that Arthur will realize that no thefts have
taken place or that someone else has committed them.
If Bob is guilty, what he may permissibly do is more difficult.2 8
Let us suppose that he knows that although the police will not be
brought in, he will be fired and will have some difficulty getting a
new job if he admits to theft. Only some conflicting duty or privi-
lege could override his employee duty to cooperate. Assuming that
Bob has no unusual duties toward others that would warrant his
refusing to reveal the truth, does he yet have some moral privilege
of self-preservation that permits him to do so? The argument to
that effect is that no one can fairly be expected to bring an ex-
tremely harmful consequence, such as being fired, upon himself.29
The strongest version of the suggested principle would treat an
individual's self-harming behavior as being actually immoral.30 A
weaker version would consider the right of self-preservation as
somehow offsetting Bob's duty to respond honestly to Arthur, leav-
ing Bob in some sense morally free to decide which course to take.
How Bob makes the choice might be thought to be morally indif-
ferent. Or the choice to respond honestly, a choice relatively few
people would be willing to make, might be regarded as morally
settings discussed, in Winston, supra note 22, at 843-44 & n.93.
27. A. John Simmons has suggested that "[the] existence of a positional duty is a morally
neutral fact," A. J. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLMCAL OBLIGATIONS 21 (1979), but
that view fits comfortably with the idea that if one undertakes "to discharge those positional
duties," id., he is under a moral obligation to perform them, and it also fits comfortably
with the assumption that strong consequentialist reasons will normally support performance
of positional duties.
28. More precisely, if an honest account of his activities would make Arthur think he is
guilty, the possible justification suggested below would apply.
29. Fully developed, such a principle would require qualifications I do not discuss. Per-
sons can be expected to bring consequences this bad upon themselves if the only alternative
is even worse consequences for loved ones. And people who voluntarily enter into roles that
involve the taking of extreme personal risks for the welfare of others presumably have a
moral duty to take those risks when the occasions arise.
30. That, of course, has been the traditional position on suicide and may have been
Locke's view on agreeing to become a slave. See A. J. SIMMONS, supra note 27, at 67.
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preferable, but not demanded by moral duty.31
A kind of natural rights argument might be advanced on behalf
of a principle of self-preservation, the claim being that any individ-
ual has a basic right to avoid very destructive consequences to
himself even if submission would serve the welfare of others.3 2 Ap-
plied to innocent people, this claim has much appeal, yielding such
conclusions as that someone cannot be blamed for declining to do-
nate a kidney to save the life of a stranger. When the person's orig-
inal wrongful act creates the risk of the very harmful conse-
quences, the claim is more dubious. Still, regrettable as the original
wrong was, and justifiable as the threatening response may be, per-
haps the person committing the wrong should not be thought to
have a moral duty to cooperate in bringing the consequences of
that response upon himself.
The self-preservation claim will take on added force m many sit-
uations, because the wrongdoer's fate is closely tied to that of
others. Children, a spouse, other relatives and friends, will be pul-
led down by any catastrophe that occurs to hun. Even if he could
somehow disregard considerations of his own interests, he might
decide that his duties to aid those nearest to him outweigh his
duty to his employer.
The proposed principle of self-preservation is hard to defend on
the basis of any simple standard that judges acts by their contribu-
tion to the general good. Even if he makes reference to the welfare
of family members, one who commits serious wrongs will often not
be able to say persuasively: "Humanity will be better served if I
avoid detection." But the following somewhat more complex utili-
tarian defense of the principle might be urged:
People generally will be happier (or otherwise better off) only if
they develop a character that strenuously avoids self-destructive
actions. Even though application of a refined utilitarian calculus
to particular actions might sometimes require such behavior,
persons with the desired character will be incapable of submit-
31. The mere fact that most people who find themselves m a particular situation will not
perform an act does not foreclose the possibility that the act is required by duty, especially
when, as with thieves who are under suspicion, the class of those in the situation is deter-
mined by original wrongful acts by members of the class.
32. Cf. T. HOBBES, LEvATHm, ch. 14 (Oakeshott ed. 1955).
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ting their own vital interests to such a calculus.33 Thus, a society
should try to develop in individuals the kind of character that
will not yield self-interest or the interests of loved ones in the
situation that Bob faces, and we should not prescribe moral
principles that require such sacrifices.
This justification faces a special hurdle in connection with wrong-
doers. Broad perception of a duty to answer honestly about serious
wrongdoing would help discourage the original wrongful acts.3 4 So,
the application of a self-preservation principle to these situations
could be accepted on broad utilitarian grounds only if the benefits
of extension outweighed the likely reduction in deterrence of the
original wrongs as well as the benefits of discovering more
wrongdoers.
Assuming that a right of self-preservation relieves Bob of his
duty to respond honestly, does it justify his actually lying to Ar-
thur or only his refusing to respond?3 5 By lying, Bob would ac-
tively try to thwart Arthur's legitimate efforts to learn what hap-
pened and perhaps cast suspicion on some innocent person. He
would also violate his general duty to tell the truth. Thus, more
powerful supporting grounds are necessary for lying than for si-
lence. Yet, remaining silent may be ineffective to protect any of
Bob's vital interests,"8 so his practical choice may be between tell-
ing the truth and lying.3 7 This is so, at least, if the principle of self-
33. To be more precise, a person with the desired character would not be capable of sub-
mitting to a substantial worsening of his own position according to such a calculus. The
argument is more difficult that the overall results would be benign if most people felt free to
improve satisfaction of their own vital interests at the expense of the general welfare.
34. In close personal relations in which one feels obligated to be open and honest, the
anticipation of having to disclose a wrong often constitutes a serious constraint.
35. The importance of a self-defense as a ground for lying is discussed in S. BoiK, LYING
83-84 (1978). Bok's examples include wrongdoers who lie to prevent discovery, but she does
not analyze whether the justification properly applies to these cases.
36. It is, however, possible that Bob might think his chances of being retained or finding a
new job would be greater if he did not actually admit his guilt.
37. I slide over a subtle point here. Assume that the self-preservation principle is
grounded solely on protection of vital interests and would justify Bob's refusal to respond if
he could thereby protect vital interests, but that silence will be wholly ineffective in this
respect, producing the same consequences as truth-telling. One might say that the principle
confers a right to remain silent despite the practical futility of silence; or, one might say, as
I would be inclined to do, that in light of the obvious ineffectiveness of silence the moral
grounds for that course are removed, leaving in effect the duty to speak honestly and per-
haps a possible justification for lying.
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preservation is understood as concerning actual protection of Bob's
interests. If instead the idea is taken to be that persons have a
right not to contribute actively to their own downfall, then silence
may be perceived as an important option to telling the truth even
if it will not be effective in warding off any harmful consequences.
I am sorry to report my own uncertainty over the scope and
power of the proposed principle of self-preservation. Partly be-
cause I think wrongdoers are primarily interested in the conse-
quences that may befall them, not whether their own admissions
play a role in bringing about those consequences, I see the princi-
ple as mainly concerned with avoidance of harmful consequences;
though I also see some force in the idea that most of all a person
should be able to refrain from taking an active role. I believe that
lying does require much more powerful justification than simple
refusal to respond. Beyond these points, much seems to depend on
the magnitude of the original wrong, the effect of the harmful con-
sequences on the wrongdoer and those close to him, and the effect
on the original victim of discovering the facts. If, for example, Bob
has stolen a small amount of food, his continued employment is a
desperate need for himself and his family, and he is confident he
can refrain from stealing in the future, the argument that he can
lie to avoid discovery and certain dismissal is rather strong.38 If,
however, Bob has disguised himself and viciously assaulted Arthur
at night in his store, he knows he is subject to periodic fits of rage,
and he knows that Arthur will remain terrified until he discovers
his assailant, his duty to speak the truth may well outweigh any
interest in self-preservation or claim to remain passive.
Whatever the strength of the self-preservation principle, it obvi-
ously applies to the earlier stage of slender suspicion as well as
when questions are based on substantial grounds. Thus, it rein-
forces the other arguments I have made s for why even a guilty
38. This assumes, of course, that the lies do not lead Arthur to blame and dismiss some-
one else who is innocent.
39. It is, in fact, closely related to the principle that an individual need not come forward
to admit a wrong when that is unnecessary for rectification. The self-preservation principle
as here elaborated is stronger in that it can sometimes override duties one would otherwise
have. Powerful self-preservation reasons may override some duties of rectification as well as
other duties, though as the hypothetical in the text indicates, when the victim's interest in
rectification is great and cannot be accomplished without identification of the wrongdoer,
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person is not under a moral duty to respond at that point.
How can Arthur appropriately react if Bob does refuse to re-
spond? Few innocent people would decline to explain away evi-
dence of their wrongdoing, so a refusal to respond is strongly indic-
ative of their guilt. Although guilty persons may more often lie
than remain mute, some still may be unwilling to lie and others
will lack confidence that they can tell plausible lies. Because Ar-
thur's concern and questions are appropriate, he need not hestiate
to accord a silent response its actual probative weight; and even if
Bob is innocent, his refusal to answer represents an unjustifiable
failure of duty. Thus, Arthur will be justified if he dismisses Bob.
This conclusion does not rest on rejection of the argument that
the self-preservation principle gives Bob a moral right to silence.
Even if Bob is morally justified in putting himself and his family
before his employer's interest in discovering the wrong, Arthur ob-
vibously need not give Bob's interests priority. And it would be ludi-
crous to say that in serving his own interests and giving silence its
natural effect, Arthur is somehow interfering with Bob's right not
to respond. That right is not a right to be thought innocent or a
right to escape harmful consequences, but is a right not to help
bring about those consequences. What would otherwise be appro-
priate actions by Arthur-are not turned into wrongs because they
reduce the practical value of Bob's right. We should reach the
same conclusion about the possibility that questions directed at
suspects often produce lies. We do not hold the people who ask
proper questions responsible for those lies, or believe that they
should disregard the lies if they discover them.
E. Inquiry and Remorse
Since admissions of guilt often are accompanied by statements
of remorse, questions directed at someone suspected of committing
a wrong may lead that person to express remorse. In what may be
the fullest philosophic defense of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in recent years, Robert Gerstein contends that people
should be able to express remorse in private settings and when
they are freely inclined to do so, and that the state should not
self-preservation does not seem a sufficient basis for withholding the truth.
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compel such expressions. 40 His argument is directed at the criminal
process, but in this section I consider briefly the possible relevance
of a similar argument to private relations.41
We should recognize that expressions of regret need not be ac-
companied by the revelations of deep emotional feelings of guilt
that concern Gerstein. Apologies do often accompany admissions,
and may be "owed" to victims,42 but even a sincere apology may be
something much more modest than the outpourings of a stricken
conscience.43 In regard to compulsion, we should avoid too purified
a notion of the conditions of freedom to develop and express feel-
ings of remorse. Seeing how others are hurt by our actions and
consequently suspect or resent us, often leads us to remorseful
feelings. Questions put by victims might be conceived of as part of
a natural process that does not interfere with the wrongdoer's free-
dom both to develop feelings of remorse and to decide how to re-
veal them.
Even if the victim's questions and likely inferences from silence
were seen as circumscribing the wrongdoer's freedom in some sig-
nificant way, that would not undercut their appropriateness. When
Ann questions Betty, she is not trying to get her to apoligize or feel
guilty; she is only trying to figure out what went on, a matter of
legitimate concern to her. That her actions may possibly have the
unfortunate side effect of pushing Betty into a premature expres-
40. See Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britain, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 81
(1979); Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger
Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1979); Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETMIcs
87 (1970).
41. Part of Gerstein's concern is that the suspect is forced "to make public the judgment
by which he has condemned himself in conscience." Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimina-
tion, 80 ETmics 87, 92 (1970). In private contexts, an admission will not be fully public, but
it may be compelled and may be to an audience the wrongdoer would not select under other
conditions.
42. An apology is not only, or perhaps even primarily, a revelation of emotional feelings;
it is a performative utterance made to someone who has been wronged that may be crucial
for rectification once a person's guilt is evident. Imagine that B admits to C, but in front of
A that he has wronged A. B then proceeds to tell C how badly he feels about what he did, all
in A's hearing. Although A knows how much remorse B feels he still might say to B, "But
you haven't even apologized yet."
43. An apology in some circumstances need not even involve an indication that one re-
grets his initial choice. One can apoligize profusely for being late even while one claims that
the lateness was necessitated by some stronger obligation.
1981]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sion of remorse does not alter their moral status."
IV. A RIGHT TO SILENCE AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. The Implications of a Moral Right to Silence Against the
State
So far, I have made a number of suggestions about the morality
of silence when one private person questions another about possi-
ble wrongdoing. What, if anything, do my conclusions - some
drawn confidently, others more tentatively - have to do with the
government's efforts to enforce the criminal law? At the least, the
previous discussion illuminates some possibly important distinc-
tions; for example, between the suspected person's weighing of
moral claims and the victim's weighing of moral claims. I believe,
however, that the discussion also provides an important starting
point for resolving questions about the state's use of its power. Un-
less important relevant differences call for variant treatment, the
moral principles governing private relations should also govern re-
lations between the state and individuals. Thus, inquiry about the
significance of private relations for the criminal process requires
close attention to special features of an individual's relation to his
government. For now, we need put from our minds the Fifth
Amendment and its interpretations because our present interest is
in the practices we would recommend for a society not constrained
by existing legal doctrines.
One critical aspect of its authority is the government's power to
compel people to tell the truth, by confining those who refuse to
answer and by treating lies as criminal. Unlike private persons,
who are very rarely morally justified in using actual or threatened
physical coercion to compel others to speak,45 the government's
44. Gerstein himself does acknowledge that some negative inferences from silence are ap-
propriate but says that "[tio find evidence of guilt in the motivation for silence . . . is to
impugn its legitimacy." Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britain, 27 AM.
J. Comp. L. 81, 111 (1979). His endorsement, from the vantage point of moral philosophy, of
the present English distinction between what may and may not be inferred from silence is
insensitive to the relative unimportance of that distinction in most cases. See Greenawalt,
Perspectives on the Right to Silence, in CRImE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 239-40,
243-44 (R. Hood ed. 1974).
45. In extreme cases, as when disclosure will save lives, the use of physical force by pri-
vate persons may be justified.
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employment of such force is often warranted. Persons disagree
about the proper occasions for that force and about the ideal scope
of various privileges that excuse persons from answering questions.
Few doubt, however, that forcing witnesses is sometimes appropri-
ate even though the truth will embarrass the witnesses, put them
in an uncomplimentary light, or jeopardize important interests of
their own or of persons about whom they care deeply. If incrimi-
nating remarks are to receive special treatment, some special justi-
fication must apply to them.
One important question is whether the suspect has less moral
obligation to tell the truth to criminal investigators than to victims
in private relationships because the moral grounds in favor of re-
sponding honestly are weaker or because some counterveiling priv-
ilege of self-protection is stronger. In favor of the first alternative,
it can be argued that because the establishment of criminal guilt is
not directly connected to restitution to victims, and because many
criminal acts either do irreparable damage or do not involve spe-
cific victims, a criminal's admission of guilt has little to do with
compensatory justice. Moreover, the questions are not being put by
the victims themselves, as in my two private examples, but by
third parties, so any special duty to respond to the one who has
been wronged is absent.46 Finally, the ties between suspect and
government are less close than in many private relationships and
do not involve the voluntary undertaking of responsibilities that
typifies friendship and employment. 47
None of those points is a very powerful reason for considering
the moral grounds in favor of truth-telling to be weakened. In pri-
vate contexts, too, compensating for wrongs is often separable from
admitting guilt. When redress can be made for criminal wrongs, its
initiation usually depends upon identification of the criminal. And
establishment of guilt and punishment work more subtle forms of
46. Insofar as this point has force, it has application when wrongs are done to large im-
personal private organizations.
47. The thrust of most social contract theories (here impliedly rejected) is to find some
sort of voluntary undertaking of obligations toward the government by citizens, or by a
broader category of residents. Only for naturalized aliens and government officials does such
an approach seem plausible. For a thorough review of the arguments, see A. J. SIMMONS,
supra note 27, at 57-100.
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partial rectification, relieving victims and others of insecurity,48
and satisfying normal desires that those who have caused injury be
punished. Because victims usually want crimes solved, officials who
investigate crimes can fairly be seen as representing them, as well
as the larger public. Therefore, the suspect's responsibility to an-
swer honestly seems little affected by the fact that someone other
than the victim is putting the questions. Nor does the comparative
weakness of a suspect's relation to the government mean that the
moral bases for his telling the truth to criminal investigators are
also weak. Often when individuals choose whether to comply with
government initiatives, moral responsibilities concerning interests
of very great moment are involved, and this is true of criminal in-
vestigations. Everyone has a strong moral duty not to inflict unde-
served harm on fellow members of the community, and to prevent
harms others might commit when he can do so easily. Those appal-
ling examples of urban apartment dwellers who do not even pick
up their telephones when a neighbor is being viciously assaulted
are a powerful reminder of what life can be like when people do
not act upon this duty. Since the establishment of guilt usually
limits a crime's harmful effects and helps protect the community
against future crimes, powerful moral grounds exist for contribut-
ing to the solution of serious crimes. These grounds apply to per-
sons deciding whether to admit they have committed crimes.
If a suspect has, all things considered, less moral duty to tell the
truth to criminal investigators than to victims in many private re-
lationships, the reason is not that the grounds for honesty are
weaker, but that some countervailing privilege of self-protection is
more powerful, more powerful because of the potentially fearful
consequences of admitting a serious crime. Even if we believe that
open admission of guilt is usually the course of action that is best,
we may hesitate to say that someone has a moral duty to bring
conviction and imprisonment upon himself.
Closely related to this point about self-defense is an argument
based on the character of the relation between government and
48. This feeling is particularly sharp when one fears that the same criminal may strike
again. If one believes that he has been victimized by someone with whom he is familiar,
uncertainty over who committed the crime can breed an unsettling distrust of all those who
might have done so.
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suspect. Lies made to enemies are more easily justified than lies
made to others,49 both because less generally is owed to antagonists
and because most antagonistic relationships lack the foundation of
trust upon which the duty of honesty partly depends. From the
perspective of the person formally accused of criminal acts, the
government plainly has become an enemy in an important sense.
Although prosecution may be halted by proof of innocence, and
aspects of a theory of punishment may include rehabilitation and
reintegration into the general society once the criminal's "debt"
has been paid,50 the government is nevertheless proceeding to es-
tablish that the suspect deserves to be cut off from society and
placed in a highly unpleasant environment for the near term:51
That is enough to make the state an enemy from the accused's
point of view. Even before formal accusation, someone focused
upon as a suspect faces the state as an antagonist, and anyone who
fears prosecution may regard the state as a potential foe. The
"state-as-enemy" argument supports the conclusions of the self-de-
fense argument,52 but does it fairly apply to those who are guilty?53
Do persons acquire a moral privilege to lie or to remain silent when
their own original wrongful acts have caused the state's antago-
nism? As I have earlier suggested, the self-defense argument is
based on the moral justifiability of preserving oneself from harmful
future consequences, and it may apply even to those who are to
blame for creating their vulnerable position." Similarly, even
though a person is responsible for the state's justified enmity, the
state's adoption of an antagonistic position may weaken his re-
sponsibilities toward it.5
49. See S. BOK, supra note 35, at 141-53.
50. These elements are, of course, not present for capital punishment.
51. The imposition of harm upon the wrongdoer is a much more central feature of the
criminal process than of attempts to establish guilt in most private contexts.
52. The state-as-enemy argument is not simply a reformulation of the self-defense argu-
ment, though they will often go together. The first argument could apply to dealings with an
antagonist who is unable or unlikely to impose consequences one fears, the latter to dealings
with friends who might, upon learning the truth, take misguided actions in pursuit of one's
welfare.
53. For the innocent person who is prosecuted, the fact that the state is designedly trying
to cause him great harm does seem an additional reason why he might be justified in not
telling the truth if he thought that that would damage him.
54. Cf. T. HOBBES, supra note 32, ch. 21.
55. This is a troublesome point. In personal relations, if one's wrongful act causes justified
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The suspect's perspectives do not by themselves determine the
appropriateness of a right to silence. Rather, that depends on the
view of the criminal process that the government, and society gen-
erally, should properly take. Even when the process has reached a
stage of explicit adversariness, the government cannot treat the
suspect like an unqualified enemy. In the first place, the point of
the process is to establish accurately who is guilty; until that is
clearly done the government must treat a suspect as possibly inno-
cent.56 Second, whatever view the suspect may justifiably take to-
ward the prospect of imprisonment, the government cannot forget
that criminals will eventually be reintegrated into the community
and they should be so treated. 7 Third, the government may owe
all its subjects a degree of respect just because it is the most pow-
erful and most inclusive representative of the whole society. At the
same time, the government cannot accept the view that the sus-
pect's desire not to be convicted somehow ranks equally with soci-
ety's wish for conviction of the guilty. The criminal process is not a
battle between equally meritorious combatants to see which of two
inconsistent but equally weighty goals will be achieved s.5  From so-
enmity, one would not be warranted in treating the person as an enemy so long as a restora-
tion of better relations is possible. If the wrong causes an irrevocable antagonism, there may
come a time when the original wrongdoer may permissibly act as an adversary.
56. Sissela Bok says "a special case might be made for deception in lawful, declared hos-
tilities, as against tax-evaders or counterfeiters . . . ." S. BoK, supra note 35, at 144. She
continues, "the more openly and clearly the adversaries, such as criminals, can be pin-
pointed, and the more justifiable, therefore, the criteria for regarding them as hostile, the
more excusable will it be to lie to them if honesty is of no avail." Id. Government deceit
does seem most acceptable when it is directed at those already known to be guilty (e.g., high
figures in organized crime) or when it will impinge seriously only on those who are guilty
(e.g. a simple trap is set that will attract only those who wish to commit crimes).
57. See Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
58. Some of the rhetoric in former Justice Fortas's well known defense of the privilege
against self-incrimination comes close to such a conception. Fortas, The Fifth Amendment:
Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.A.J. 91 (1954). He said:
[The Englishman] himself was a sovereign. He had the sovereign right to re-
fuse to cooperate; to meet the state on terms as equal as their respective
strength would permit ..
... Equals, meeting in battle, owe no [duty to furnish ammunition to the
other side], regardless of the obligations that they may be under prior to bat-
tle ..... [The government] has no right to compel the sovereign individual to
surrender or impair his right of self-defense.
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ciety's broader perspective, the aim of the process is to clear the
innocent and convict the guilty.
The government's pursuit of accurate determinations, however,
must be limited by principles of humane treatment. Whether
grounds exist to make a suspect's refusal to respond morally ac-
ceptable, government compulsion to force admissions is inhumane.
Though articulation of the grounds of this intuitive judgment is
not easy,5 9 the broader principle within which it falls is the cruelty
of forcing people to do serious harm to themselves, even when in-
fliction of the same harm by others is warranted.60 That the right
to silence rests on this basic moral perception, is suggested by judi-
cial talk of "our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."6
When most witnesses feared damnation if they lied under oath and
the penalty for felonies was death, the choice was particularly ex-
cruciating, but it remains cruel for the government to force people
to help convict themselves, lie,62 or be confined for contempt. This
is particularly so when the government is not going to take excul-
patory statements. on their face, but is committed to seeking evi-
dence against, or convicting, someone, despite whatever account he
offers.68
If the moral basis for the right to silence in ordinary criminal
cases is the inhumanity of forcing admissions, what should the
Id. at 98-99.
59. See Ellis, A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth Amendment, 55 IowA
L. REv. 829, 838-39 (1970).
60. A similar principle can be invoked against forcing people to testify against close loved
ones. The marital privilege is based on such a principle, but it may deserve wider applica-
tion, though extension creates serious line-drawing problems. As Ellis has pointed out, the
chances of genuine compulsion to testify truthfully against loved ones are much less in prac-
tice than in legal theory. Id. at 837.
61. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
62. The special force of the oath is now uneven. Some people regard lying under oath as
abhorrent; others lie with apparent equanimity. Few criminal defendants are subsequently
convicted of perjury. If they are not believed, they will probably be convicted of the original
crime; if the original jury acquits them, the prosecution will be hard put subsequently to
prove that they committed perjury, unless they plainly did so on some straightforward pe-
ripheral matter.
If lying under oath by suspects and defendants were immunized from punishment, their
choice would be altered. But the government's compulsion upon them to testify and risk
being trapped or otherwise damage their chances would still be cruel
63. See Winston, supra note 22, at 825.
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dimensions of the right be? When substantial evidence exists
against someone, allowing ordinary inferences from his silence and
dismissing him if he refuses to speak about his performance of
public duty hardly seem inhumane. These are, rather, natural con-
sequences of his choice to remain silent. Undoubtedly, those prac-
tices may affect a suspect's or a defendant's choice to speak, but
the moral right to silence should not be viewed as a right to be
released from all the normal influences to respond to accusations.
Rather, it should be viewed as a right to be free of the especially
powerful compulsions that the state can bring to bear on witnesses.
Some support for this conclusion may be drawn from the practice
of other liberal democracies. As far as I am aware, no nation grants
silence as absolute a protection as our present principles purport to
afford.8 ' In England, for example, some adverse comment on pre-
trial silence and on refusal to take the stand is now permitted. 5 In
the early 1970's, the prestigious Criminal Law Committee proposed
expansion of presently permissible inferences and the adoption of
other strategies to encourage responses to questions;66 these pro-
posals failed after heated debate, 7 but even their opponents did
not generally argue that existing practices were unfair.,
From the moral point of view, pressures and tricks designed to
get suspects to confess are much more questionable than infer-
ences from silence and dismissal. When law enforcement officers
browbeat suspects, play on their weaknesses, deceive them as to
crucially relevant facts (such as whether a suspected confederate
has confessed), or keep them in a hostile setting, the officials inten-
64. On civil law countries, see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 526-30
(1973); Voulin, France in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDuAL FREEDOM 258-79 (C. Sowle ed.
1962). Canadian procedures are discussed in Martin, Canada in id. at 249-54; L. MAYERS,
SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFrH AMENDMENT? 6, 71-76 (1959).
65. Both the prosecutor and judge may comment on a defendant's pretrial silence; only
the judge can comment on defendant's failure to testify. Comments may not suggest that
the jury draw an inference of guilt but may invite it to give less weight to an account the
defendant offers for the first time at trial and to give added weight to evidence the defen-
dant fails to answer. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 235, 240, 243-44.
66. CRMINAL LAW REvISION CoMm., Eleventh Report, EVDENCE (General) §§ 29-46, 110-
12 (1972).
67. See Gerstein, The Self-Incrimination Debate in Great Britain, 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 81
(1979).
68. See generally id.; Greenawalt, supra note 44.
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tionally manipulate the environment to make rational, responsible
choice more difficult. Such tactics hardly accord with respect for
autonomy and dignity,69 and they work unevenly by undermining
the inexperienced and ignorant and having little effect on the
hardened criminal.7 0 These tactics can be defended only under
some extreme version of the battle model of the criminal process71
or, more persuasively, with the argument that some compromise
with ideal procedures is required because getting admissions from
suspects is so crucial to solving crimes. The Miranda rules,7 2 as
well as their predecessor standards for coerced confessions, were
formulated largely to curb the worst tactics of this sort, but the
Supreme Court has not yet adopted constitutional principles that
would effectively prevent admissions obtained by pressure and de-
ceptions that would be considered immoral in private contexts.
How powerful is the moral right to silence in relation to criminal
investigation before a substantial basis exists for suspicion? I have
suggested that for private relationships a stronger moral right ordi-
narily exists before this threshold is passed. Does this idea have
application to the criminal process, and if so, how should it affect
the right to silence that a legal system grants?
As to most crimes, public officials should not question persons as
suspects unless they have a substantial basis for doing so. Murders
and other very serious crimes are exceptional in this respect; their
solution is so important that anyone who conceivably may have
committed them may properly be asked for an account of his activ-
ities that will establish his innocence. But, if citizens were com-
monly questioned by officials about their possible commission of
more garden-variety crimes, such as petty theft and income tax
evasion, an unhealthy atmosphere of resentment and distrust
would result. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive the formulation
69. Cf. Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-56 (1978).
70. Judge Friendly has emphasized the "equal protection" objection to such techniques.
See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tommorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CN. L. REv. 671, 698, 713-15 (1968). Dorsey Ellis relates this point to perceptions among
disadvantaged segments of the community regarding the system of criminal justice. Ellis,
supra note 59, at 850.
71. Such a defense faces the problem that some of those pressured and deceived are inno-
cent, and even those who are guilty may be further alienated by being manipulated.
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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of any legal principle that could effectively forbid such question-
ing.73 People are often questioned about their possible knowledge
of crimes committed by others, or about their "innocent" mistakes
on tax returns. The line is very thin between such questions and
those treating someone as a suspected criminal, and the official's
view of the respondent may shift because of answers to earlier
questions. We must, therefore, trust mostly to the good judgment
of officials, and to their paltry resources, 4 to protect citizens from
inappropriate fishing expeditions.
Except, perhaps, for the gravest sorts of crimes,75 an actor does
not have a moral duty to come forward and admit his guilt publicly
unless that is necessary to provide restitution, to prevent his com-
mission of future similar acts, 6 or to avoid injustice to others. If he
happens to be the subject of inappropriate questions directed to-
ward his possible guilt, they do not create a new duty to reveal the
incriminating facts. His moral right to silence at that point does
not, therefore, depend on some privilege of self-preservation over-
riding what would otherwise be a duty to respond, and thus rests
on a firmer foundation than any right to silence after substantial
evidence has been discovered.
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination itself sup-
ports this distinction. What the initial advocates of a right to si-
lence proclaimed was that they could not be required to respond to
incriminating questions in the absence of due accusation. 7 The
73. However, something analogous does exist when questions impinge on First Amend-
ment rights. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
74. In urban centers, the problem is that police do not have time to question even prime
suspects for many burglaries and other crimes.
75. A murderer may have a duty at least to identify himself and apologize to those close
to the victim. Ordinarily this may be accomplished only by his admitting his act to officials.
Some murders disturb the public enough so this duty may be owed to a much broader class.
76. I have in mind here the person who recognizes that his penchant for violence almost
certainly will lead him to commit more brutal acts. It might be argued, of course, that the
criminal has a duty to offer himself up for purposes of general deterrence, but even though
he has committed a wrong that makes his punishment for that purpose appropriate, it
would be stretching the notion of his duty too far to include that.
77. See, e.g., L. LnvY, OIGINs op THE FIFTH ANDNmEmNT 62 (1968). Even during the worst
days of the Holy Inquisition, Aquinas and other canon law authorities wrote that persons
should not be required to confess to hidden crimes whose existence was unknown, and the
theory was maintained that persons brought before the Inquisition had been "accused" in
some manner, even if only by vehement suspicion or common report. Id. at 95-96.
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moral right not to supply the initial evidence against oneself is
much more basic than any right not to respond to inquiry follow-
ing substantial evidence. And the argument is powerful that an in-
dividual should not suffer serious adverse consequences because he
invokes that more basic right.7 8 Though the question is close, I
think the argument is strong enough to overcome the contrary
claims that silence even at an early stage is somewhat probative of
guilt and should be accorded its natural force. Thus, I conclude
that although adverse inferences are proper when a person refuses
to respond to questions based on substantial evidence of his
wrongdoing, those who bear responsibility for determining guilt
should not be allowed to draw such inferences from silence that
has occurred before substantial evidence of wrongdoing exists. 9 In
support of this conclusion is the desirability of reducing the incen-
tives for officials to engage in unwarranted fishing expeditions.
B. The Force and Implications of Other Reasons for a Right to
Silence
I have tried to analyze the grounds for a moral right to silence in
the criminal process and the rough legal dimensions of a right re-
sponsive to those grounds. I shall subsequently say a little more
about desirable institutional approaches, but now I want briefly to
consider other possible grounds for a right to silence, examining in
a summary way whether these grounds provide a basis for ex-
panding or contracting the dimensions of the legal right so far
outlined.
78. Investigative resources, however, may appropriately be concentrated on someone who
refuses to respond rather than on those who provide convincing exculpatory accounts.
79. The text contains an implicit judgment that is debatable even if my major distinction
is accepted. Sometimes a person will refuse to respond to questions that are appropriately
put to him prior to evidence of his guilt. This can happen because the crime is so grave that
the net of those who can properly be questioned as possible wrongdoers is very wide or
because the question is genuinely directed to him as a possible witness, not a suspect. Si-
lence in either instance may be probative of guilt. By suggesting that inferences not be
allowed even in these situations, I am putting major emphasis on the principle that one
should not have to supply the initial evidence against himself rather than on the principle
that he should not have to reply to inappropriate questions.
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1. Protection of the Innocent
The right to silence may prevent some convictions of innocent
people.80 If forced to speak, some innocent defendants would make
very poor witnesses, and some innocent suspects would make dam-
aging admissions. Every once in a while, we are made aware of in-
stances in which suspects confess to the police under great pres-
sure, and their confessions are subsequently demonstrated to be
false. There can be, however, no solid evidence indicating how
often innocent people who remain silent before or at trial and are
acquitted would have been convicted if they had spoken.81 Given
the very high incidence of convictions of defendants who decline to
testify, we must doubt that silence helps many innocent persons.8 2
And it must be a fairly unusual occasion when truthful pretrial
statements by innocent people lead to prosecution and
conviction. 8
Stricter safeguards against police pressures would provide better
protection against the kinds of tactics that might induce false ad-
missions during interrogation. Allowing inferences from silence and
dismissal from public employment would increase in one respect
80. Since convictions of the innocent rightly are regarded as much worse than acquittals
of the guilty, a practice that protects the innocent can be defended even though it detracts
from the overall rate of accurate determinations.
The right to silence of other witnesses may actually contribute to the conviction of some
innocent defendants by allowing the true culprits to conceal their guilt. Judge Friendly has
expressed the view that the innocent are more often harmed than aided by the right to
silence. Friendly, supra note 70, at 580-81.
81. See Ellis, supra note 59, at 844-45, on the likely dimensions of the problem. Compare
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) and Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 10 RUrTGRs L. Rav. 541, 548 (1956) with United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) and A. TRAIN, FROM THE Disnucr ATToRNEY's OFFic 97 (1939).
82. Judge Friendly notes an old study in which 21 of 23 defendants who failed to take the
stand were convicted. Friendly, supra note 70, at 699 (citing A. TRAw, THE PRIsoNnR AT THE
BAR 109-12 (1923)). Silence undoubtedly does help some defendants who thereby avoid hav-
ing damaging prior records introduced for impeachment purposes, but the need for silence
in those circumstances could be eliminated by sharper restrictions on the use of prior
convictions.
83. The dangerous situations are those in which the line between guilt and innocence is
not clear. See Greenawalt, supra note 44, at 254-55.
Some of the risks inherent in pretrial statements could be eliminated by an accurate re-
cording system. A more radical innovation in American procedure would be to prohibit use




the pressures on innocent suspects and defendants to speak and
the former also would run the risk that jurors might give too much
weight to the silence of those who do not speak. But the dangers to
the innoccent from these practices appear slight. Other aspects of
our system of criminal justice threaten convictions of the innocent
much more severely: juries can convict on uncertain eyewitness tes-
timony; jurors are prejudiced by the routine introduction of prior
convictions to impeach defendants; and, most pervasively, pleas of
guilty are accepted when guilt has not been firmly established."
Although the value of protecting the innocent may properly figure
as one aspect of arguments in favor of a right to silence, 5 it cannot
carry the burden of justifying the right to silence in general or of
forbidding inferences and dismissals.
2. Other Methods of Establishing Guilt
Some have feared that acceptance of the principle that govern-
ment may compel incriminatory admissions would lead to grossly
abusive methods of acquiring confessions and to disregard of less
obnoxious, more reliable, techniques of gathering evidence."
Whatever may have been the historical connection, there is little
reason to suppose that legal compulsion in formal proceedings
would now lead to torture or other obnoxious methods of coer-
cion,87 much less to think that adverse inferences from silence
would have that effect. In many cases, methods of gathering facts
that do not depend upon questioning of suspects will prove ineffec-
tive or too burdensome;88 and one of the main points of my earlier
discussion is that many other techniques for establishing guilt are
actually worse from a moral point of view. In any event, if a right
84. See Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 L. & CoNTEMP. PRO.
102, 119-26 (1977).
85. See Ellis, supra note 59, at 844-48.
86. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
87. Indeed, the opposite result is possible. If investigators knew that suspects would be
subject to orderly inquiry, there might be less temptation to use informal pressures. See Y.
KAMIsAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 79-80 (1980).
88. Again, if one thinks of most urban crimes, the problem is that the police use no meth-
ods of investigation, not that they use a less preferred method. If unreliable pretrial confes-
sions were deemed a serious problem, the introduction of all such confessions at trial could
be barred, with the police required to gather "more objective" evidence on the basis of the
confession.
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to silence were denied or limited only after substantial indepen-
dent evidence of a person's guilt were produced, other methods
would ordinarily have to be employed to build the original case.
3. A Fair Balance Between State and Individual; and Guilty
Pleas
The Supreme Court and others sometimes have supported the
right to silence with reference to the values of an accustorial sys-
tem and to a fair balance between state and individual that re-
quires that government to "shoulder the entire load" of proving
guilt.8 9 These ideas are either a shorthand reference to the points
about methods of proving guilt or the cruelty of requiring an indi-
vidual to testify against himself,90 both already discussed, or they
substitute conclusory rhetoric for analysis of what procedures are
fair. In either case, they demand no separate analysis here.
One thing these phrases do, however, is obscure the nature of
our own criminal process for roughly ninety percent of the cases.
The ordinary prelude to criminal conviction is the negotiated
guilty plea, which is so widespread precisely because it relieves the
state of shouldering the entire load of proving guilt.91 In that pro-
cess an accused is treated as a rational bargaining agent, but the
state permits his conviction without a thorough formal inquiry into
his guilt and determines his penalty partly on the basis of what it
may take for him to waive that inquiry. This hardly shows an ac-
cused great respect or evidences serious concern with the supposed
goals of criminal punishment. Our present system of plea bargain-
ing hardly can induce anything but cynicism in the participants.
That system is largely the product of the complexity and difficulty
of the fuller criminal process. Insofar as a very expansive right to
silence before and at trial impedes efficient ascertainment of guilt,
it contributes to a guilty plea alternative that treats an accused
with little respect and concern.
89. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
90. Yet another possibility is that they point toward symbolic values of the right to si-
lence, treated below.
91. See L. WEINm n, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 71-86 (1977).
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4. Crimes That Should Not Be Crimes
The right to silence developed with claims to freedom of reli-
gious conscience and has been used in recent history as a defense
against political persecution. In the private sphere, if a friend or an
employer treats as a wrong something that a person believes is not
a wrong, the person may find a new friend or employer. But gov-
ernments have a monopoly on the definition of criminal wrongs,
and emigration is often not a feasible option. By guarding some
people against conviction for inappropriately defined crimes, the
right to silence affords some protection against abuse of this mo-
nopoly power: The impact of the right will be especially great in
respect to victimless crimes; and the crimes against which it has
special effect may correlate positively with the sorts of crimes a
society should not enact.92 Still, the effects on enforcement of
proper crimes are a fearful price to pay for partial protection
against some improper crimes. Moreover, the latter can better be
guarded in other ways. Other constitutional protections, particu-
larly freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equal protection, due
process constraints on vagueness, and the so-called substantive
right of privacy, now provide ample protection against most of the
gross abuses of statutory definition. Concerns about such abuses
can now provide only marginal support for the right to silence and
are not a sufficient basis for opposing my suggestions about ad-
verse inferences and dismissals.
5. Arbitrary Prosecution
Another kind of abuse against which a right to silence provides
some protection is arbitrary selection of persons to be prosecuted.
Almost everyone commits one crime or another at some time in his
life and most people commit crimes of some seriousness. If, in the
abuse of prior evidence, government officials could discover by sus-
tained inquiry whether any particular person had committed crim-
inal acts, tremendous discretion would be placed in officials to de-
termine who would suffer criminal conviction. This discretion
92. One must be cautious, however. The right to silence is a potent bar, but it would not
stop enforcement of crimes cast in terms of expression, or even belief, when public state-
ments have been made.
93. See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Af-
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would endanger unpopular figures and political opponents. Of
course, officials presently have substantial discretion to determine
who will be prosecuted,94 but the desirability of constraining the
exercise of that discretion provides a very important reason in sup-
port of my suggestion that before substantial evidence of guilt is
discovered the legal right to silence should be expansive.
6. Expressions of Remorse
Because of the public character of admissions at trial and to law
enforcement officers, 5 the argument for silence grounded on the
unacceptability of compelling expressions of remorse9" may seem
especially strong in relation to the criminal process. However, the
purpose of factual inquiries about crime is rarely to elicit remorse.
In addition, the connection between acknowledgement of incrimi-
nating facts and expressions of genuine remorse is much weaker
here than in the context of close personal relations. Suspects who
are questioned by police and defendants at criminal trials will
often admit damaging facts that may contribute to their conviction
without ever admitting criminal behavior. When actual guilt is ad-
mitted, it is often unaccompanied by any remorseful expression
and even when such expressions are offered, they are frequently
not sincere.97 The tactics of inquiry most likely to force honest ex-
pressions of remorse are police pressures which play heavily on
pangs of conscience and push guilt-stricken suspects into emo-
tional outpourings. Concern that people should be able to develop
and express feelings of remorse privately may reinforce the conclu-
sion I already have suggested that strong police pressures are not
consonant with the respect a government should accord its
fectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, in POLICE POWER AND INaruvmuAL
FREEDOM 223, 232-33 (C. Sowle ed. 1962). One can imagine a regime of widespread enforce-
ment of minor crimes, but law enforcement officials presently have such difficulty making
any response to many serious crimes that that specter is now much less realistic than the
concern about selective enforcement.
94. For some thoughts on how that discretion should be exercised, see Greenawalt, Con-
flicts of Law and Morality: Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REv. 177, 210-22 (1981).
95. Whether an admission to one or two police officers itself counts as public, the admis-
sion is likely to be revealed to a larger audience.
96. See the three articles by Robert Gerstein, supra note 40.
97. The encouragement of insincere expressions of feeling is not to be desired, but is an




The occasional instance, on the other hand, when formally com-
pelled testimony would produce an honest expression of remorse is
hardly a substantial argument against such testimony. Compelled
testimony may lead witnesses to the expression of other deeply
personal feelings, such as shame, or force them to play parts that
may cause lifelong self-condemnation, as when a person has to re-
veal the guilt of a close friend. In light of all the necessary but
unintended cruelties that accompany a system of compulsory testi-
mony, singling out public expressions of remorse as particularly
unacceptable is odd. In any event, allowing inferences from silence
and dismissal from public employment would have slight effect on
the number of times when remorse is expressed.
7. Symbolic Significance
Apart from its specific effects, the right to silence might be de-
fended as a valuable symbol of each person's autonomous indepen-
dence, and of the limits of government power.9 S But a symbol that
portrays each person as a separate sovereign unit, justifiably fend-
ing off aggressions by a hostile force, may have a harmful side.
This symbol may make people less sensitive to the indignity of
other techniques of investigation and guilt determination, tech-
niques that might be appropriate between enemies, but are unac-
ceptable within genuine communities. And such a symbol may
weaken the sense that obedience to law is something more than the
bad man's calculation of most likely advantage. Logically, no
doubt, the view that a suspect is to be treated at arms length as a
thoroughgoing adversary is reconcilable with the view that all
should obey the law; but a person who is encouraged to think that
his unconstrained pursuit of advantage in the criminal process is a
natural right may also conclude that selfish prudence is the only
good reason for complying with the law.99
The most unqualified claims in favor of a right to silence erect
98. See C. FmD, ANATOMY OF VALUES 145-46 (1970).
99. In an unpublished paper, Purpose and Paradox: Studies in the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, Thomas Schrock says, "The other side of the emphasis on sanction and self-
preservation can be a de-emphasis of right and wrong, of obligation to obey the law, and of
concern about loss of community."
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individual self-centeredness into a norm. At least for cases of prop-
erly grounded suspicion, the proper basis of a right to silence lies
elsewhere, in the notion of compassion. The right should be viewed
as a concession to the narrow concerns of most of us, not as an
endorsement of that narrowness or a rejection of broader norms of
concern and cooperation. Once the right is so understood, we are in
a position to take a truer view of the acceptability of actions based
on its exercise. That persons are indirectly encouraged to forego
the right is not a cause for dismay, so long as government actions
have independent justification and are not taken for the purpose of
forcing waivers. Inferences based on silence and dismissal will not
undermine what is truly valuable in the symbolism of the right.
8. The Lessons of History
Given the tremendous complexity of evaluating most social insti-
tutions, it sensibly cari be argued that if the judgment about a
practice is complicated and uncertain, as it is with the right to si-
lence, we should not abandon ancient usages. This argument has
little force in respect to inferences and dismissal. For most of the
history of the right to silence, persons suspected or accused have
had considerable pressures to speak and negative inferences have
been drawn from their silence. The question of what the govern-
ment may do as employer to persons who refuse to respond to in-
quiries is a relatively recent one. Substantial changes in the pro-
cess of criminal investigation might represent a sharper break with
established procedures. However, the practices these modifications
would replace, such as police pressures to admit guilt, constitute
present limitations in the right to silence that clearly are in tension
with the idea that the government owes respect even for those sus-
pected of criminal acts.
C. Institutions
What might the criminal process look like if a serious attempt
were made to implement my suggestions? Though no formal pro-
hibition would bar questioning persons as possible suspects, super-
iors would discourage investigatory officers100 from doing so in or-
100. Lloyd Weinreb has provided a powerful argument that investigation should be per-
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dinary cases absent a significant likelihood of guilt. By a
"significant likelihood of guilt," I mean a flexible standard that
would depend on the seriousness of the crime but would often be
less rigorous than probable cause. For example, if an apartment
burglary were apparently committed with a set of keys, each of
four outsiders with keys could be asked where they were at the
time of the burglary. More probing, systematic questioning of a
suspect should take place only after probable cause of guilt exists,
the point at which arrest is now possible. A neutral official, a mag-
istrate, should determine the presence of probable cause before
this more intense questioning occurs. To avoid possible pressure
and deceitful manipulation, the questioning should not be done by
the police alone, but by a magistrate or in front of him,10 1 and the
suspect should be accorded counsel.1 0 2 To avoid any subsequent
misinterpretation of what took place, a precise record should be
kept.103 At each of these stages, a person would have the privilege
of remaining silent. Fact-finders would not be permitted to draw
adverse inferences from refusals to respond prior to questioning
before the magistrate; but if a suspect then claimed his right to
silence, that fact would be introduced as adverse evidence at his
trial. If a defendant did not testify at his trial, the jury could be
invited by the judge to draw an adverse inference from his silence.
I lay no claim to originality for most of these suggestions. Almost
fifty years ago, Paul Kauper proposed that suspects be questioned
before magistrates and that failure then to respond be admissible
in evidence. 04 More recently, two of our most distinguished jurists,
formed by an investigating magistracy rather than the police. L. WENREB, DENIAL OF Jus-
TICE (1977). That possible change in present practice is peripheral to the main concerns of
this discussion.
101. A magistrate might question in a fairer manner, but allowing law enforcement of-
ficers to do the questioning would take advantage of their familiarity with the case and
minimize the risk that the magistrate would become partisan. See Y. KAmsAR, supra note
87, at 89-90. For jurisdictions retaining grand juries, questioning of suspects before them
would be an alternative to questioning before magistrates, though the usual absence of
counsel in that setting would raise a problem.
102. An informed representative rather than a full-fledged lawyer might be sufficient.
103. The absence of accurate recording is a critical objection to present interrogation
practice.
104. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree,
30 MICH. L. R.v. 1224 (1932). The relevance of his proposal in the present context is
thoughtfully discussed in Y. KAmisAR, supra note 87, at 77-94.
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Walter Schaefer'0 5 and Henry Friendly,106 have urged such a proce-
dure. As I have said, comment on silence at trial is now allowed in
England 0 7 and was permitted in some jurisdictions before the Su-
preme Court said the practice violates the Constitution.0 " What I
do wish to urge strongly is that procedures like these would be
more consonant with the degree of respect a government owes its
citizens than the practices we now possess.
V. THE MORAL RIGHT TO SILENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment to be
much more restrictive of inferences from silence and of dismissals
from public employment than the suggestions I have made.109 The
Court has yet to declare unconstitutional forms of pressure and de-
ception that are in severe tension with ideas of respect.11 0 Thus,
authoritative constitutional doctrine now accords a right to silence
that is both more and less expansive than what should be regarded
as a moral right to silence against the government. In this section,
I inquire whether either constitutional amendment or constitu-
tional interpretation should bring the two more closely into line.
In what is perhaps an excess of caution, let me say that I do not
start from the premise that constitutional rights and moral rights
against the government must be congruent. Even in its most open-
ended and flexible provisions, the Constitution does not protect
every moral right against the government, and it should not be
stretched by interpretation, or amended to do so.1 Some constitu-
105. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SocIETY 76-81 (1967).
106. Friendly, supra note 70, at 713-16.
107. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
108. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
109. The relevant interpretations are discussed below. See notes 123-64 & accompanying
text infra.
110. See Y. KAmisAE, supra note 87, at 86-87; White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confes-
sions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1979).
111. The proposition that the courts are not authorized to create constitutional rights
whenever they perceive moral rights is relatively straightforward, though not entirely uncon-
troversial. The reasons against amendments to protect remaining moral rights are more
complex. Some moral rights may be difficult to formulate or inappropriate for courts to
administer; thus one might recognize that a citizen has a right to a decent education or a




tional rights have little or nothing to do with moral rights.112
Others are grounded in moral rights, but appropriately go beyond
these moral rights,113 or provide one specific form of protection for
a moral right when different safeguards would suffice.' 14 The diver-
gence between moral and constitutional rights becomes a concern
when one underlying reason for a constitutional right is a view of
what morality requires and other bases for the right do not provide
adequate reasons for its present scope. That, I believe, is now the
posture of the privilege against self-incrimination.
A. Amendment
The proposals I have made about inferences, dismissal, and in-
terrogational pressures are not important enough to warrant con-
stitutional amendment. These would constitute marginal altera-
tions in the privilege against self-incrimination. To use the
amendment process to make such alterations in the Bill of Rights
would be to undermine its rich symbolism as a simple statement of
individual freedom. Even if one could identify other desirable
changes in the scope of the right to silence, 5 touching matters I
have not discussed, adoption of the detailed language necessary to
effect the changes would be unfortunate.116 Only if the federal gov-
ernment or a number of states offered some fundamental recon-
struction of the criminal process, and these efforts were turned
away by the courts, should amendment be considered a serious op-
tion. In the meantime, changes in the coverage of the Fifth
Amendment should take place by interpretation, if they should
112. For example, the rights conferred on individuals that are designed to preserve the
federal structure.
113. Citizens may have a moral right not to have an official state religion, but the broad
scope of the establishment clause may be justifiable only in terms of the need for relatively
sharp lines and as a shield against political divisiveness.
114. Individuals may have a moral right not to be subjected to criminal conviction with-
out an opportunity for judgment by their peers, but a government need not provide grand
and petit juries as those institutions have developed in England and the United States.
115. Judge Friendly argues for changes concerning production of documents and registra-
tion and reporting requirements. Friendly, supra note 70, at 701-03, 716-20.
116. See Judge Friendly's proposed language at id., 721-22. He discusses the criticism
that an amendment of so many words should be avoided, id. at 725, and concludes that "it
would be far better if any needed adjustment could be accomplished through judicial action
.... "Id. at 726.
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take place at all.
B. Interpretation
1. Ethical Evaluation and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
Before examining the specific doctrines encompassing the topics
I have discussed, I need to say a few words about the general rele-
vance of ethical evaluation for interpretation of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The most modest position is that ethical
evaluation should be employed only when the basic moral judg-
ments upon which it rests are thought to correspond with those of
the Framers, and then only to resolve the constitutionality of prac-
tices whose status is left in doubt by the constitutional language
and the pre-constitutional history. A widely accepted, though
somewhat more controversial, view is that courts may also employ
values accepted by the Framers to reach judgments about particu-
lar practices that differ from those of the Framers. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court's imposition of constitutional limits on or-
dinary libel law might be thought warranted as a fulfillment of the
Framers' philosophy of freedom of expression, even if the Framers
themselves would have considered all libel outside the ambit of
speech protected by federal and state constitutions.1 1 7 Finally, one
may believe, as I do, that present ethical evaluation can properly
figure in guiding the development of constitutional provisions even
when that evaluation cannot reasonably be thought to correspond
with the Framers' views.1 8 This is not the occasion to try to de-
fend that belief. Nor is such a defense necessary for what follows,
because I perceive no clear divergence between the values of the
117. I add the caveat about state constitutions because the Framers may not have
imagined that federal law, to which the original Bill of Rights exclusively applied, would
contain ordinary principles of libel law.
118. One might ground this position on the view that the Framers wished to invite reli-
ance on changing moral conceptions. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49
(1977). That the Framers had any such intent is dubious even in regard to more open-ended
constitutional language, like the cruel and unusual punishment clause, and is implausible in
respect to the privilege against self-incrimination, whose language was meant to capture
existing principles. A persuasive justification of the power to rely on present ethical judg-
ment must rest on the claim that it will help a constitution to serve and endure as a vital
part of a liberal democracy.
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Framers and our own as they bear on these issues."'
For the problems of concern here, the Framers' views about par-
ticular practices are not very helpful. Claims against compulsory
self-incrimination had arisen mainly in reaction to questions about
religious orthodoxy and political loyalty that had been put by En-
glish prerogative courts to persons who had not been formally ac-
cused. Though early assertions of the privilege were cast in terms
of the wrongfulness of demanding that people not otherwise ac-
cused of crime be required to accuse themselves, these claims had
been broadened to cover all formally compelled self-accusation.
Our Constitution states that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." That language
plainly forecloses any compelled testimony of a defendant, but it
reflects no clear judgment about informal pressures to speak. Lack-
ing professional police forces, late eighteenth century society en-
forced its criminal law in a manner substantially different from
current practices. At least into the 1700's, the questioning of sus-
pects by magistrates was common and only infrequently did it
prove unproductive. 120 A suspect's responses were introduced at his
trial. 211 Because defendants were not even allowed to testify under
oath, no questions of forced testimony arose, but unsworn state-
ments by defendants were usually made and silence on their part
undoubtedly hurt their cause.1 22 The Framers did not mean explic-
itly to bar agents of the government from informally seeking self-
disclosure of those suspected of ordinary crimes, nor to preclude
119. See generally L. Lvy, THE ORIGINS or THE FwTH AMENDMENT (1968). Stanely Katz
has remarked that "we do not yet fully understand the conception of 'individual rights' in
the 17th century," Katz, Book Review, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 226, 233. Even if that view is
correct and applies to the eighteenth century as well, we may be forgiven for relying on our
own values in the absence of any more authoritative starting point.
120. See L. LEvy, supra note 119, at 325-30; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2250;
Kauper, supra note 104, at 1231-37; Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1038-40 (1964). Only in 1848 was a statute
passed in England requiring that suspects be warned that they need not speak. See 1 J.
STEPHEN, HISTORY oF THE CIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 441 (1883).
121. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2250.
122. In England, felony defendants were not allowed full representation by counsel until
1836, see Note, supra note 120, at 1022-30, and undoubtedly most felony defenalants in the
colonies lacked counsel. The accused himself thus had to present whatever factual defense
he had. According to Stephen, any defendant who did not answer questions posed by the
prosecution was likely to be convicted. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 120, at 440.
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those who were determining guilt mainly on the basis of other evi-
dence from taking into account failures to speak in circumstances
when most innocent persons would wish to speak, nor to limit what
government agencies might do in response to invocations of a right
to silence by government employees.
Although the Framers made no negative judgment about infer-
ences from silence and dismissal from government employment,
these practices bear enough relation to the underlying values and
explicit protections of the privilege against self-incrimination to be
within the range in which judicial development of rights is war-
ranted. And the reasons against informal compulsions to speak are
so closely linked to the reasons against formal compulsions that
application of the privilege against self-incrimination is appropri-
ate to them, even if historically the due process clause was per-
ceived as the constraint on admission of coerced confessions. 12
Thus, room exists for creative judicial interpretation in each of the
areas I have discussed. The issue is whether the interpretation that
has thus far occurred is adequately sensitive to the relevant values.
Before I proceed to examining the Court's work, I may say that I
reject suggestions that the Court should approach all arguable
claims of individual right with a heavy weight on one side of the
scales. Significant protections of individual rights would not be
possible if the courts took the view that all curtailments of govern-
ment power must rest on clear constitutional mandates. Thus, that
position of extreme judicial restraint is unacceptable. Equally un-
acceptable is the position that because the protection of moral
rights is so important, doubtful cases should always be resolved
against the government. If the expansion of criminal procedure
rights makes it more difficult to convict the guilty, the expansion is
at the expense of the victims' moral rights to obtain redress, and it
increases the likelihood of future violations of other persons' moral
rights not to be subjected to criminal wrongs. Neither in specific
constitutional safeguards nor in our general plan of government
can I find any principle that rights of individuals against other in-
dividuals should invariably yield to claims of rights against the
government, when the two are in potential conflict.
123. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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2. Inferences from Silence
I want to discuss first, and most thoroughly, what the Supreme
Court has said about the inferences a jury may be invited to draw
from a defendant's refusal to take the stand at trial or his silence
at some earlier stage.
a. Silence at Trial
Although legal rules about instructions cannot stop jurors from
assuming that a silent defendant is a guilty defendant, these rules
can have some effect on juries, and on judges sitting as triers of
fact. They also can state a standard about the import of the right
to silence.
Prior to 1965, a minority of states permitted adverse comment
by a judge on a defendant's failure to take the stand. The federal
rule against such comment rested upon statutory interpretation. In
Griffin v. California,12 however, the Court declared both judicial
and prosecutorial comment to be unconstitutional. Failing to draw
any distinction between the prosecutor's sharp remarks about Grif-
fin's refusal to say what he knew and the trial court's measured
instruction that the jury could consider the defendant's failure to
deny or explain evidence against him as tending to support its
truth, Justice Douglas, for the majority, said that comment is "a
remnant of the 'inquisitional system of justice'. . .. It is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. ' 125 In Griffin
the Court did not decide whether a defendant is positively entitled
upon request to an instruction that the jury may not give weight to
his silence, but on March 9 of this year it resolved that question in
the defendant's favor.1 26
Because jurors are likely to weigh a defendant's silence whatever
they are told and because most defendants take the stand to avoid
124. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). A decision on the federal constitutional issue was made neces-
sary by the Court's holding a year earlier that the federal privilege against self-incrimination
applies against the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
125. 380 U.S. at 614.
126. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981). In Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333
(1978), the Court rejected defendant's argument that he had a right to have the judge re-
frain from giving any instruction about his silence. Id. at 340-41.
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that consequence, 127 the decision in Griffin may not be of great
practical significance. Insofar as it does make a difference, the de-
cision's effect may be benign, not because a great number of inno-
cent defendants are stopped from testifying by their lawyer's fear
that they will make poor witnesses,'12 but rather because innocent
defendants in many American jurisdictions are deterred from testi-
fying by the unjust practice of allowing prior convictions to be rou-
tinely admitted to impeach a defendant's credibility. 12
9
What is worrisome about Griffin is not, therefore, the outcome
for trial practice, but the underlying conception of the privilege
against self-incrimination. That conception is aptly caught by the
Court's statement that comment imposes a penalty. In what sense
is it a penalty? A "penalty" is ordinarily a harmful consequence
imposed by a person or agency as punishment for a wrongful act.
Neither the jurors' drawing of natural inferences in the attempt to
figure out where the truth lies, nor the judge's comment about in-
ferences that may naturally be drawn is a penalty in that sense.
Comment is not transformed into a penalty by the simple fact that
the defendant may be worse off as a result, or by the possibility
that his initial choice might be affected.130 If boyfriends do not eat
raw onions because girlfriends will be less likely to kiss them if
they do, we do not suppose that the disinclination of girlfriends to
kiss onioneaters is a penalty. Justice Douglas's use of the term
127. In the cases studied in H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 137, 146
(1966), 82% of defendants and 91% of those not subject to impeachment by prior convic-
tion took the stand. For a juror's observations about the wisdom of a defendant taking the
stand even though he made a poor witness, see M.D. ZERMAN, CALL THE FINAL WITNESS, 154-
55 (1977).
128. The majority makes much of this point in Griffin, quoting at length from Wilson v.
United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893), which contains a powerful statement of that concern. 380
U.S. at 613.
129. This fear apparently underlay the defendant's decision not to testify in Carter v.
Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1115 (1981).
130. It might be thought relevant how powerfully the consequence operates on the defen-
dant's choice, one that imposes considerable pressure being considerably more "penalty-
like" than one that imposes slight pressure. See McGuatha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971), declaring that a practice is not an impermissible penalty unless it "impairs to an
appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." Id. at 213. Since the
prospect of modest adverse comment by the judge is not likely to have great impact on the
defendant's choice, particularly in light of the ability of his own counsel to provide an expla-




"penalty" can only be interpreted as a kind of rhetorical device
used to emphasize how sacrosanct is the right to silence. It implies
a view far removed from the notion of a compassionate concession
to the strength of self-centeredness in human personality.
I have suggested that the right to make inquiry of suspects is
strongest when substantial independent evidence of guilt exists.
From that perspective the moral right of silence is weakest when a
person is formally charged and the prosecution has adduced sub-
stantial support of this guilt. As long as the trial court makes clear
that silence is not itself proof of guilt, that the prosecution retains
the burden of establishing guilt, and that the reasonable doubt
standard must be met, I believe that restrained judicial comment
inviting natural adverse inferences should be considered constitu-
tionally acceptable, at least in jurisdictions that do not allow free
use of prior convictions to impeach credibility. 13 1
b. Silence Before Trial
If the defendant has remained silent at some stage prior to trial,
can that silence be considered by the jury as relevant to the likely
truth of a version of events the defense offers at trial? The two
recent Supreme Court cases are Doyle v. Ohio,3 2 decided in 1976,
and Jenkins v. Anderson,'3 decided in 1980. Doyle testified at his
trial that he had been "framed"; in cross-examination the prosecu-
tor brought out that Doyle had not previously offered that account,
and he argued that if the story had been true Doyle would cer-
tainly have protested along those lines when placed under arrest.
The Supreme Court majority held that, because Doyle had been
given Miranda warnings, his postarrest silence could not be used
131. Such is presently the law in England. See note 65 & accompanying text supra. There
a distinction is drawn between permissible inferences about evidence the defendant was in a
position to rebut and did not, and impermissible inferences that his silence indicates guilt.
When, as usually is the case, his silence concerns the crucial facts of guilt or innocence, the
distinction is mostly formal, and even on the abstract theoretical level, it may not be defen-
sible. What is crucial is that jurors not be allowed to use silence as the main, or substantial,
evidence of guilt.
Whether prosecutors should be allowed to comment seems to me doubtful. Prosecutorial
comment is much less likely to be restrained than judicial instructions, and much more
likely to lead jurors to give undue weight to silence.
132. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
133. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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to impeach his testimony. The warnings impliedly assured Doyle
that no harm would come to him if he remained silent, and it
would violate due process for the state to renege on that implicit
promise. At his trial for murder, Jenkins acknowledged that he had
inflicted the fatal knife wounds, but claimed that he had acted in
self-defense. The prosecutor tried to impeach his credibility, estab-
lishing that he had not come forward to the police with that story
and suggesting that a person who genuinely acted in self-defense
would have done so. The Court held that this use of silence to im-
peach credibility violated no constitutional right.
Although Justice Powell authored the majority opinions in both
Doyle and Jenkins, they lie in uneasy tension with each other,1 34
and neither opinion satisfactorily comes to grips with many of the
underlying issues. We may begin our analysis with an attempted
synthesis. Jenkins endorses' 5 the 1926 holding in Raffel v. United
States36 that when a defendant testifies at a second trial he may
be impeached with his silence at his first trial. Thus, according to
Justice Powell, even if a defendant is undeniably exercising a Fifth
Amendment right in the most formal and obvious setting for the
exercise of such rights, his silence may subsequently be used to
impeach him. Since the Court gives us no basis for a contrary con-
clusion, we must suppose that it believes that the exercise of the
privilege before the police can also be used to impeach.8 7 On this
premise, the result in Doyle can only be justified by the implica-
tion of the Miranda warning that no use would be made of a sus-
pect's silence. That implication could be corrected. The police
could warn suspects of the dangers of speaking and then also men-
tion that if one chooses to remain silent, that fact might eventually
be brought out if the suspect chooses to testify. But perhaps most
134. Part of the explanation may well be that some justices who joined him in Doyle
dissented in Jenkins, and some justices who joined him in Jenkins dissented in Doyle. The
opinions may have been tailored to capture the votes of the particular justices in each
majority.
135. On this precise point, the division is five to four, because Justice Stevens and Justice
Stewart, concurring, as well as the two dissenters, reject the majority's analysis. 447 U.S. at
241, 245.
136. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
137. The Court has never suggested, as I have, that the right to silence should be stronger
at earlier stages in the criminal process. Nor did it suggest in Doyle that some inherent
compulsion about police interrogation would make inferences from silence inappropriate.
[Vol. 23:15
RIGHT TO SILENCE
suspects would have difficulty grasping the significance of such a
qualification to the warning."' 8 In that event, surely it should be
sufficient to give the qualification after the suspect has counsel and
to let him consult with counsel over whether the risk of impeach-
ment by silence should be run.
Because Jenkins casts no doubt on Griffin v. California, the
Court's position is that the Constitution permits the use of silence
to impeach a defendant's testimony even when any other use
would be forbidden.131 This distinction is hard to maintain.1 4 0 The
Court talks about testimony as a waiver of the right of silence, but
surely the defendant's testifying cannot reasonably be taken as a
waiver of his right to silence exercised at a prior trial or before the
police. At each stage of the process he has a right to speak or not,
and his right at an earlier stage should not be retroactively deter-
mined by what he chooses to do at a later stage.
The Court's main argument is that when one takes the stand one
opens oneself up to all the traditional truth-testing devices. The
opinion quotes and relies on Harris v. New York,14 1 which holds
that statements taken in violation of the Miranda warnings may
be used to impeach a defendant's contradictory trial testimony.
But what was involved in Harris was significantly different from
what was involved in Doyle and Jenkins. In Harris, inadmissabil-
ity of evidence was treated as a sanction for a rule violation by the
police, and the Court determined that the additional deterrence
gained by employment of the fruits of the violation did not war-
rant the restriction on impeachment use.I4 2 In Doyle and Jenkins
138. See Y. KAmsAR, supra note 87, at 92. The suspect's or the defendant's actual antici-
pations are of doubtful relevance under Raffel, since it is unlikely that when the decision
was made that Raffel would not take the stand at his first trial, either he or his lawyer was
thinking about what might happen if the jury deadlocked, and he were retried and wished
to testify at the second trial.
139. Justice Powell himself, concurring in Carter v. Kentucky, has indicated that he be-
lieves Griffin was wrongly decided. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 241-45 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 245-54
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
142. I have grave difficulty with this rationale in Fifth Amendment cases. If a statement
obtained in violation of the Miranda warnings does actually constitute compelled self-in-
crimination, use at trial of that statement also seems to constitute compelled self-incrimina-
tion. The force of this logic can be avoided, of course, if the Miranda rules are considered,
as the Court has indicated on occasion, prophylactic safeguards that go beyond what the
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the suspect has exercised his right to silence. If, as both Griffin and
Miranda143 suggest, one aspect of the right is that no adverse infer-
ence can be drawn from silence, use of silence for impeachment
purposes directly impairs the right.
Even more crucially, the nature of the inference drawn in Jen-
kins is fundamentally different from that in Harris. In Harris, the
defendant has told conflicting stories on two occasions; almost cer-
tainly he has lied at least once. If he is demonstrably a liar, the
jury may discount his trial testimony."" In Jenkins there is noth-
ing inconsistent about original silence and a claim of self-defense.
Any adverse inference must run along the following lines. If Jen-
kins had really acted in self-defense, he would have come forward
soon after the crime. He did not do so, so he probably did not act
in self-defense. Therefore, his present testimony to that effect is
probably not true. The central point is that the adverse inference
would be just as strong if Jenkins did not take the stand and other
witnesses testified that he acted in self-defense; the force of the
inference goes to the plausibility of that version of the events, not
(except indirectly) to whether Jenkins is a truthful person or is
telling the truth on this occasion. At least as far as the constitu-
tional principle is concerned, use for impeachment purposes in this
context 4 5 cannot convincingly be distinguished from general re-
buttal use.
Justice Stevens sensibly rejects the line drawn between impeach-
ment and general rebuttal use,146 but his alternative grounds for
permitting introduction of Jenkins's silence are just as shaky. He
argues that in the absence of government compulsion, the right to
Constitution requires. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
143. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
144. I have some problem with this view when the prior inconsistent statements are ad-
missions. (In Harris a different exculpatory statement was involved. People v. Harris, 25
N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).) Jurors are aware that defendants have
an extremely powerful incentive to lie and that many of them do so. Even if the prior state-
ments are allowed only for impeachment purposes, their main effect may be to lead the
jurors to suppose that the defendant would not earlier have made telling admissions unless
he was in fact guilty.
145. Perhaps in special circumstances, silence will appear more directly relevant to defen-
dants' truthfulness, and my remarks do not cover that possibility.
146. 447 U.S. at 244 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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silence has no application to the prearrest situation.1 47 But the
government cannot compel self-incrimination at any point in the
criminal process. At each stage if the government does not actually
compel someone to speak, the question arises whether allowing
subsequent adverse inferences from silence will constitute a forbid-
den (if weaker) form of compulsion or an unacceptable "penalty"
on the protected choice not to speak. The only basis I can see for
distinguishing among stages is in terms of the actual, or tradition-
ally understood, importance of protecting silence at each stage.
Justice Stevens, worried about the innocent defendant who will
make a bad witness, plainly thinks that protection is specially war-
ranted at the trial stage. But the suspect being interrogated by the
police is much more vulnerable than the defendant protected by
court and counsel, and the innocent person who has stabbed an-
other to death in self-defense may by admitting his involvement to
the police be bringing on himself prosecution and possible convic-
tion. ' " Moreover, Justice Stevens wholly disregards what I have
stressed as the most fundamental point in my discussion, that we
ordinarily do expect people to respond to well-founded accusation,
but we do not expect them to come forward and accuse themselves
of wrongdoing or implicate themselves in what may be mistakenly
perceived as wrongdoing.
Before proceeding to some hesitant conclusions about how pre-
trial silence should be treated, I should briefly consider some other
possible distinctions suggested by the opinions in Jenkins and
Doyle or by their facts. Various opinions in the two cases intimate
that it may make a difference whether the suspect who stands si-
lent is consciously exercising a constitutional right.14 That fact
strikes me as irrelevant;15 0 the person who simply wishes to shield
147. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Marshall calls this view "incomprehensi-
ble." Id. at 250 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority opinion does not resolve the
question whether prearrest silence is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 236 n.2.
148. Id. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 24243 (Stevens, J., concurring); 447 U.S. at
246-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617; 426 U.S. at 628 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority in Doyle talks of a suspect's silence as inherently ambiguous. 426
U.S. at 617-18. Whether it means anything more than that other explanations besides guilt
are consistent with silence is not clear.
150. One's reliance on the import of the language of warnings introduces a separate ele-
ment discussed above.
1981]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
himself by refusing to speak should be accorded the same protec-
tion as one who wishes to shield himself and knows he is exercising
a constitutional right in doing so. 15 1
The majority opinions do not rest on the form that silence takes,
but Justice Stevens suggests its possible relevance in Doyle.1 52
Suppose that at the time of arrest, or some other discrete moment,
the defendant would have been extremely likely to have made a
spontaneous exculpatory utterance if the facts had actually been as
the defense presents them at trial. A man arrested on the street for
trying to snatch a purse, for example, would probably say "You
have the wrong guy" if he had had no contact with the victim.153
On other occasions silence may be accompanied by some act or
omission that is suggestive of guilt. If A is with B when B is
stabbed in a deserted place and leaves him disabled there, his fail-
ure to summon any sort of medical assistance might be considered
probative of guilt. Even if ordinary silence should be immunized
from adverse inferences, silence and inaction in these special set-
tings might be treated differently.15 4
The hard general question for me is whether, when prearrest si-
lence shares none of these special features, adverse inferences
should be constitutionally barred. In favor of permitting them is
the argument that the inferences are natural and are not a penalty
on silence, the very argument I made against the reasoning in Grif-
fin. One argument to the contrary is that juries may give so much
more weight to prearrest silence than it warrants that such evi-
dence should be forbidden. Justice Marshall regarded the sug-
gested inference in Jenkins as so implausible that its presentation
151. Even if the distinction were relevant in theory, it could be administered only in some
very rough form.
152. 426 U.S. at 621-22, 630-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. This is how Justice Stevens treats the original failure to claim a "frame-up" in
Doyle. Since, however, Doyle acknowledged that he had been attempting to purchase mari-
juana, 426 U.S. at 612-13, he plainly had a motive to withhold his story initially from the
police even if it were true.
154. For a highly critical view toward allowance of "tacit admissions" into evidence, see
Gamble, The Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional-A Doctrine Ripe
for Judicial Abandonment, 14 GA. L. REv. 27 (1979). A per se rule against use of postarrest
silence to impeach defendants' credibility is proposed in Comment, Impeaching A Defen-




violated due process, and the point could be generalized that the
prejudicial dangers of introducing prearrest silence are often so
great that its use should never be allowed.155 One source of worry
in this connection is the fact that development of the significance
of pretrial silence can only be done by prosecutorial efforts. Since
the relevant facts must be exposed and examined at trial, judicial
comment alone is not an option. A second argument against al-
lowing inferences is that the right of citizens not to come forward
and accuse themselves is so fundamental that its exercise should
be shielded from harmful consequences. The thrust of my discus-
sion has been that this right is indeed more fundamental than the
right not to respond to due accusation, and I believe it is funda-
mental enough so that inferences should be constitutionally
prohibited.
If, as I suggest, a certain point in the criminal process should be
reached before silence can lead to an adverse inference, what
should that point be? One might take the view that only after the
prosecution has established its case at trial is there substantial
enough evidence of someone's guilt, but from the perspectives both
of likely guilt and reasonable investigative need, an earlier deter-
mination of probable guilt should suffice. Making arrest the crucial
stage might place too much weight on the discretion of the police.
A formal, though summary, finding by a neutral official would be a
more appropriate dividing line. Whoever determines substantial
evidence of guilt, I think that failure to speak in the uncomfortable
environment of police custody should not lead to adverse infer-
ences. More adequate protections such as the routine presence of
counsel, reliable recording systems, and perhaps questioning by or
in front of a neutral magistrate, are needed for those suspects who
do speak, before juries should be allowed to infer that those sus-
pects who do not speak have something to hide.158
155. Cf. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 420-24 (1957) (discussing possible im-
permissible impact on jury of silence before grand jury); People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174,
400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 56 (1980) (danger of
prejudice if silence at time of arrest introduced).
156. The import of these suggestions is that under present practices, assertion of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination before grand juries should ordinarily not be a permissible
basis for adverse inferences, both because witnesses are unrepresented by counsel and be-
cause no neutral official has yet made a finding of substantial evidence of guilt. Exercising
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3. Loss of Employment
Given what I have said thus far, I can indicate the sources of my
discontent with prevailing principles on termination of government
employment rather summarily. After some sharp divisions in the
1950's and 1960's, 111 the Supreme Court has apparently settled
upon the following principles. 158 The government cannot dismiss
an employee because he invokes the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. If the government grants him immunity from criminal
prosecution, it can then fire him if he refuses to answer relevant
questions about his work, and it can also fire him if he testifies to
corruption or dereliction of duty under a grant of immunity. But if
the government declines to grant him immunity, it cannot "penal-
ize" his refusal to respond, or his refusal to waive immunity, by
terminating his employment.
Once there is substantial evidence of an employee's wrongdoing,
I have argued that if he fails to offer an explanation of his per-
formance of duties, termination of employment is a natural re-
sponse. The government's indulgence in this natural response
should not by itself be considered an unconstitutional penalty on
the exercise of a right to silence, or an impermissible form of com-
pulsion to testify that invalidates the testimony of those who fear
that consequence. 59
Having said this much, let me add some caveats. The govern-
ment should not be able to fire employees who invoke the privilege
in proceedings unrelated to their employment. e60 Nor should gov-
its supervisory power to bar use of defendant's silence before a grand jury to impeach his
trial testimony, the Supreme Court, in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), was
sensitive to the nature of grand jury proceedings and to the unfairness of expecting a poten-
tial defendant to furnish evidence against himself. Id. at 421-24.
157. See, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956). Cohen and Spevack involved disbarred lawyers, most of the Justices assuming
that the principles applicable to public employment were relevant to disbarment.
158. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). Cunningham involved a party official and
Turley a contractor, but the Court decided that the principles relating to public employ-
ment were applicable.
159. I take the same view about revocation of the license to practice law, but I do not
defend that view here or attempt to analyze which relationships with the government can
properly be the basis for imposition of some adverse consequences based on failure to speak.
160. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956). There may be a
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ernment employees have to respond to every fishing expedition
concerning possible wrongdoing; as with adverse inferences at trial,
dismissal should generally be permitted only if there is substantial
prior evidence of wrongdoing. Perhaps this principle should be re-
laxed for high officers with very important government responsibil-
ities; they carry special responsibilities to preserve the openness
and integrity of government operations" 1 and perhaps should be
expected to respond about their own performance whenever that
has become an official concern. Finally, although a practice of dis-
missal on a case-by-case basis seems appropriate, statutory re-
quirements of automatic dismissal are unacceptable. Such inflexi-
ble working smacks of an intent to force testimony rather than
preserve the fitness of the work force; more crucially, such wording
does not allow the government-as-employer to make the kind of
individuated response to exceptional circumstances that one would
expect from an ordinary employer. This does not mean that any
statute authorizing dismissal must be unconstitutional. If the exec-
utive branch can adopt a general policy of dismissal, the legislature
should be able to direct such a policy,10 2 but it should have to pro-
vide the employee some hearing before the government-as-em-
ployer and allow the latter some leeway to respond to unusual
circumstances. 1 3
Because the statutes the Court has reviewed have not qualified
the duty to respond by anything like a probable cause standard
and have mandated automatic dismissal,1 ' my approach might
well have produced the same results as that dictated by prevailing
principles. And because I doubt that many government employees
prosper after invoking the privilege, expanding the formal power to
few positions, for example, police chief or United States Attorney, for which dismissal would
be appropriate even for exercises of the privilege unrelated to the job. Most of these posi-
tions would be ones as to which a chief executive would have wide discretion over dismissal,
so it is difficult to imagine litigation arising over the cause of dismissal.
161. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 812 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 811 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. No doubt automatic dismissal provisions were perceived as a way of circumventing
corrupt decisions to retain corrupt employees. A statute could avoid this problem by setting
up a special committee to review the employment of those failing to respond to inquiries
about their performance of duty.
164. See cases cited in notes 157 & 158 supra.
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dismiss might not be of great practical significance. 165 Neverthe-
less, the employment dismissal cases, like Griffin, are wrong in
their conception of the nature of the privilege.
4. Conditions of Pretrial Inquiry
What I shall say about the conditions of pretrial inquiry will be
even more sketchy. Here the reason is the difficulty and complex-
ity of the subject. Any decent treatment would require another lec-
ture, so I must limit myself to a few unsatisfying observations.
As the dissenters in Miranda clearly recognized,166 the Miranda
rules are not fully responsive to the concerns that underlay their
creation. If one is concerned about the inherent compulsion of po-
lice station interrogation, he must doubt how genuinely voluntary
are many waivers given in that setting, and if one is concerned
about the truthfulness of police testimony, he must worry about
warnings, waivers, and admissions to which only suspects and po-
lice are witnesses.1 67 Not only are law enforcement officers still able
in many cases to take advantage of strong pressures to talk, they
may employ strategies, such as the placement of informers, or lies
about physical evidence or supposed confessions of confederates,6 8
that fall well below standards of respect and dignity to which we
aspire in most contexts. That the well-informed are now better
able to resist police attempts to elicit admissions than the naive is
further reason for discomfort.
A common response is that the solution of serious crimes is such
important business and the character of so many of those who
commit them so decidely antisocial, we must, as we do in war, ac-
cept tactics that "nice" people do not use in ordinary relations.
165. This became particularly true after the Court's decision that use immunity satisfies
the Constitution. Castigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). As the Court noted in
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977), a state can grant use immunity without
abandoning the possibility of future criminal prosecution. Once having afforded that immu-
nity, it can compel truthful answers, however incriminating, and fire those officials whose
answers show their unfitness for government employment.
166. 384 U.S. at 535-36 (White, J., dissenting).
167. See Y. KAmSAR, supra note 87, at 92-93.
168. See generally White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
581 (1979). As Professor White indicates, the Supreme Court has given relatively little gui-




Certainly the present climate of opinion, public and judicial, is
hardly conducive to sizeable expansion of the rights of criminal
suspects, and if the choice really is between solving serious crimes
and showing marginally more respect for suspects, I would agree
that solving the crimes should take precedence. Of course, the
truth is that the magnitude of the rights of criminal suspects has
only limited impact on police success in solving crimes. The main
determinant is police resources, and at present the police cannot
even make a pretense of investigating most serious crimes in urban
centers. But even if we limit our focus to the rights of suspects, we
should be able to have a criminal process that evidences more re-
spect for suspects, that does not operate so unequally on weak and
strong, and that does not sacrifice effectiveness. If the prosecution
could introduce a suspect's pretrial silence as evidence, all suspects
would have a substantial, rationally-based incentive to talk to in-
vestigating authorities. The burden of my presentation has been
that such an incentive is much more consonant with recognition of
the dignity of suspects than many tactics that are now permitted.
Although I do not expect substantial expansion of the constitu-
tional pretrial rights of suspects in the foreseeable future, in the
longer term a readjustment of perspective might properly produce
curtailment of some practices that are now permitted.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have made some explicit suggestions about a particular consti-
tutional right, the privilege against self-incrimination. The analysis
that has led to these suggestions has been complex, though not
nearly as complex as the subject matter may require. Some of the
suggestions can stand even if particular aspects of the analysis are
rejected. Each reader can ask himself how far his disagreements
with me over narrower points will carry through to my ultimate
recommendations.
In conclusion, I want to draw attention to the broader underly-
ing premises of the discussion. These are by no means self-evident,
and their validity, though tested by the merits of my narrower
comments, is not determined by them.
The first premise is that moral judgments about relations be-
tween private persons have great relevance to moral judgments
about relations between governments and those living within their
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domains. Some things about government are unique. But unless
specific reasons can be adduced why different moral judgments are
appropriate, reasons resting either on the general nature of govern-
ment or applicable to the particular issue, we should start with the
assumption that what is proper behavior between government and
residents will closely resemble what is proper behavior in analo-
gous relationships among private individuals and enterprises. This
starting point deflects one away from two views that are often im-
pliedly accepted if not explicitly defended: first, that government
officials have a general privilege to disregard ordinary moral con-
straints in their pursuit of public aims; and second, that individu-
als need not concern themselves with the welfare of others when
that welfare is manifested in government action adverse to their
interests.
The second premise is that illuminating analogies do exist in the
private sphere to the criminal process, and that neither the general
nature of government nor the special features of the government's
role in this context undermine the importance of those analogies
for the rights that suspects and defendants should have. As far as
the right to silence is concerned, I have suggested that the gravity
of the penalties at the government's disposition and the possibili-
ties of abuse that derive from its immense power and monopolistic
position do affect the dimensions of the legal rights that should be
recognized. I have rejected, however, the idea that the basic right
should be conceived as fundamentally different than it would be in
the private setting. Beyond what I have already suggested, I be-
lieve that citizens can have more respect for a process that largely
conforms with the judgments of their own moral sense than one
that introduces artificial protections at some points and disregards
ordinary moral principles at others.169
The third premise is that the sort of moral evaluation I have
169. The moral sense of citizens may, of course, incorporate important distinctions be-
tween private relations and individual-government relations. Therefore, a lack of conformity
between the right to silence in the criminal process and the right to silence accepted for
private relations does not necessarily show that the former is at odds with the general moral
sense of citizens. Nevertheless, although many people may accept as morally justified inter-
rogational practices they would reject for private inquiry, I believe that, for the most part,
their moral judgments about public investigation are informed by what would be proper in
private settings.
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engaged in is significant not only for legislative choice but also for
judicial interpretation of long-established constitutional rights.
If these premises are sound, moral analysis of nongovernmental
relations can often be a helpful, indeed important, tool in constitu-
tional adjudication. This insight is certainly not novel, but it infre-
quently commands explicit recognition. Its disregard in relation to
the privilege against self-incrimination has produced misleading
characterizations and mistaken directions.
